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Abstract	  
	   This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  aid	  is	  connected	  with	  democratization,	  and	  more	  specifically	  if	  official	  development	  aid	  is	  effective	  in	  influencing	  regime	  change	  and	  democratization.	  	  This	  is	  a	  preliminary	  test	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  any	  connection	  between	  aid	  and	  regime	  type,	  and	  if	  there	  is,	  then	  it	  would	  suggest	  a	  direction	  for	  future	  research.	  	  Through	  comparing	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  with	  Polity	  IV	  scores	  pertaining	  to	  regime	  type,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  while	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  correlation	  between	  aid	  allocations	  and	  democratization,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  trend	  of	  aid	  increasing	  when	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes	  begin	  to	  liberalize.	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I.	  Introduction	  	  	   There	  has	  been	  a	  global	  push	  for	  democracy,	  and	  this	  has	  been	  shown	  through	  the	  huge	  rate	  of	  transitions	  around	  the	  world	  from	  non-­‐democratic	  countries	  to	  democratic	  ones.	  This	  change	  often	  leaves	  questions	  about	  why	  these	  transitions	  were	  made	  and	  what	  influenced	  them.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  changes	  have	  been	  attributed	  to	  globalization,	  moral	  values	  and	  civilian	  uprisings,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  other	  viable	  political	  options	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I’ll	  be	  looking	  at	  the	  political	  aspect	  and	  if	  aid	  has	  any	  influence.	  	  The	  main	  question	  addressed	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  “Is	  aid	  able	  to	  influence	  and	  lead	  countries	  to	  democratize?”	  	  	  Western	  states	  have	  been	  touting	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  democratic	  system,	  along	  with	  capitalist	  based	  free	  markets	  for	  years.	  	  This	  has	  extended	  to	  policy	  arenas	  as	  well	  with	  aid	  conditional	  upon	  progress	  in	  these	  areas.	  	  	  This	  goal	  of	  spreading	  social	  and	  political	  norms	  has	  been	  evident	  not	  only	  in	  political	  discourse,	  but	  also	  in	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  World	  Bank	  (encouraging	  	  economic	  liberalization)	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  (monitoring	  elections	  in	  less	  developed	  countries).	  	  This	  agenda	  of	  spreading	  democracy	  was	  further	  expanded	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration	  (43)1	  which	  attempted	  to	  spread	  democracy	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  beyond	  with	  a	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  is	  to	  differentiate	  between	  the	  two	  Bush	  Administrations,	  identifying	  the	  difference	  by	  using	  the	  number	  of	  presidential	  order.	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aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  of	  democracy	  promotion.	  	  This	  leaves	  me	  questioning	  -­‐-­‐	  how	  effective	  is	  aid	  in	  influencing	  regimes	  and	  democratization?	  	  	   This	  is	  a	  significant	  topic	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  First,	  if	  I	  can	  show	  if	  aid	  is	  linked	  to	  democratization.	  	  If	  it	  is,	  then	  it	  will	  have	  future	  implications	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  aid	  allocation,	  possibly	  suggesting	  that	  one	  factor	  motivating	  countries	  to	  democratize	  is	  to	  gain	  larger	  amounts	  of	  aid.	  	  If	  there	  is	  no	  link,	  then	  perhaps	  it	  would	  show	  a	  need	  for	  readjustment	  in	  policy	  and	  aid	  if	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  cause	  a	  regime	  change	  or	  liberalization	  of	  the	  political	  process.	  	   In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  questions	  I	  will	  be	  looking	  at	  aid	  allocation	  via	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  (ODA)2	  and	  see	  if	  there	  is	  any	  link	  between	  aid	  allocation	  and	  regime	  type.	  	  I	  will	  be	  comparing	  the	  amounts	  of	  aid	  allotted	  from	  all	  50	  donor	  countries,	  and	  if	  there	  is	  a	  preference	  for	  any	  specific	  type	  of	  beneficiary	  countries,	  such	  as	  democratic	  ones	  or	  burgeoning	  democratic	  countries.	  	  If	  there	  is,	  then	  it	  might	  suggest	  that	  counties	  would	  be	  induced	  to	  democratize	  simply	  for	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  larger	  aid	  allocation.	  	  On	  a	  second	  level,	  I	  will	  be	  looking	  at	  countries	  that	  make	  transitions	  either	  towards	  being	  more	  democratic,	  and	  see	  if	  these	  transitions	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  aid	  allocations	  as	  well.	  	  	  Through	  this	  process,	  I	  have	  found	  that	  there	  is	  a	  trend	  for	  aid	  to	  increase	  when	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes	  begin	  to	  liberalize.	  	  However,	  once	  the	  transitioning	  countries	  reach	  a	  score	  of	  0,	  the	  luminal	  stage	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  is	  a	  classification	  for	  certain	  types	  of	  foreign	  aid	  that	  will	  be	  elaborated	  upon	  later.	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being	  neither	  democratic	  nor	  authoritarian,	  then	  there	  no	  longer	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  definitive	  trend	  for	  aid	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease.	  
II.	  Literature	  Review	  
Types	  of	  Democracy	  	   It	  is	  important	  when	  talking	  about	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  many	  different	  types	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  The	  three	  main	  types	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  are	  liberal	  and	  illiberal,	  however;	  there	  are	  several	  others,	  which	  will	  be	  briefly	  addressed.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  help	  lay	  the	  foundation	  to	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  democracy	  that	  I	  will	  talk	  about	  throughout	  this	  paper.	  	  This	  section	  will	  also	  recognize	  that	  there	  is	  a	  large	  range	  of	  different	  types	  of	  democracy	  beyond	  the	  commonly	  accepted	  liberal	  and	  illiberal	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  	  
Liberal	  Democracy	  	  	   The	  ideal,	  Western	  form	  of	  democracy	  is	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  While	  there	  are	  other	  definitions	  for	  democracy,	  which	  I	  will	  later	  address,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	  more	  common	  definition	  provided	  below.	  	  The	  main	  definition	  of	  the	  liberal	  democracy	  has	  five	  criteria	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  be	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  country:	  1.Effective	  participation.	  	  Before	  a	  policy	  is	  adopted	  by	  the	  association,	  all	  the	  members	  must	  have	  equal	  and	  effective	  opportunities	  for	  making	  their	  views	  known	  to	  the	  other	  members	  as	  to	  what	  the	  policy	  should	  be.	  
2.Voting	  equality.	  	  When	  the	  moment	  arrives	  at	  which	  the	  decision	  about	  policy	  will	  finally	  be	  made,	  every	  member	  must	  have	  an	  equal	  and	  effective	  opportunity	  to	  vote,	  and	  all	  votes	  must	  be	  counted	  as	  equal.	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3.Enlightened	  understanding.	  	  Within	  reasonable	  limit	  is	  as	  to	  time,	  each	  member	  must	  have	  equal	  and	  effective	  opportunities	  for	  learning	  about	  the	  relevant	  alternative	  policies	  and	  their	  likely	  consequences.	  
4.Control	  of	  the	  agenda.	  	  The	  members	  must	  have	  the	  exclusive	  opportunity	  to	  decide	  how	  and,	  if	  they	  choose,	  what	  matters	  are	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  agenda.	  Thus	  the	  democratic	  process	  required	  by	  the	  ...	  preceding	  criteria	  is	  never	  dosed.	  The	  policies	  of	  the	  association	  are	  always	  open	  to	  change	  by	  the	  members,	  if	  they	  so	  choose.	  
5.Inclusion	  of	  adults.	  	  All,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  most,	  adult	  permanent	  residents	  should	  have	  the	  full	  rights	  of	  citizens	  that	  are	  implied	  by	  the	  first	  four	  criteria.	  Before	  the	  twentieth	  century	  this	  criterion	  was	  unacceptable	  to	  most	  advocates	  of	  democracy.	  (Dahl,	  37).	  	  	  
This	  is	  the	  preferable	  form	  of	  democracy	  to	  the	  donor	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  liberalization	  policy.	  	  Essentially,	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  the	  ‘golden	  ring’	  and	  is	  the	  system	  that	  best	  provides	  human	  and	  civil	  rights,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  Western	  developed	  countries	  are	  concerned.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  since	  the	  Western	  democratic	  countries,	  like	  every	  country	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  all	  fall	  under	  this	  definition.	  	  
Illiberal	  Democracy	  The	  opposite	  form	  of	  democracy	  is	  that	  of	  the	  illiberal	  democracy,	  which	  was	  first	  proposed	  as	  an	  idea	  by	  Fareed	  Zakaria	  in	  his	  essay	  published	  in	  Foreign	  
Policy.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  an	  illiberal	  democracy	  	  Is	  a	  governing	  system	  in	  which,	  although	  elections	  take	  place,	  citizens	  are	  cut	  off	  from	  knowledge	  about	  the	  activities	  of	  those	  who	  exercise	  real	  power	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  civil	  liberties.	  It	  is	  not	  an	  ‘open	  society'.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  a	  constitution	  limiting	  government	  powers	  exists,	  but	  it	  is	  liberties	  are	  ignored;	  or	  because	  an	  adequate	  legal	  constitutional	  framework	  of	  liberties	  does	  not	  exist.	  (Zakaria,	  Foreign	  Policy).	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  This	  distinction	  is	  important	  because	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  difference	  between	  most	  Western	  countries,	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  for	  many	  of	  the	  freedoms,	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  freedom	  to	  organize	  and	  influence	  the	  government	  etc.,	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  key	  to	  economic	  development	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  the	  social	  freedoms	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  supply	  happy,	  relatively	  peaceful	  societies.	  	  	  Examples	  of	  illiberal	  democratic	  countries	  are	  countries	  like	  Brazil,	  Peru,	  and	  Egypt,	  where	  there	  is	  voting,	  but	  still	  restrictions	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  as	  well	  as	  the	  people.	  	  
Other	  types	  Others	  authors	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  more	  than	  just	  the	  two	  types	  of	  democratic	  regimes	  and	  that	  all	  countries	  do	  not	  fall	  neatly	  into	  a	  few	  categories.	  	  One	  suggestion	  is	  a	  different	  scale	  for	  judging	  democracy	  instead,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  dichotomous	  but	  a	  sliding	  scale	  that	  adds	  “‘pluralization’	  and	  ‘contextualization’	  of	  the	  conceptions	  of	  democracy”	  (Kurki,	  362).	  	  Kurki	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  contestability	  or	  the	  “idea	  of	  essential	  contestability	  generally	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  concept	  can	  take	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  meanings	  at	  any	  given	  time”	  (Kurki,	  371).	  	  He	  believes	  that	  no	  two	  democracies	  are	  alike	  and	  that	  current	  efforts	  to	  stick	  countries	  into	  groups	  like	  the	  two	  mentioned	  above,	  is	  a	  hasty	  generalization	  that	  does	  not	  encompass	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  system.	  	  	  There	  are	  different	  variables	  in	  definitions	  and	  Kurki	  illustrates	  his	  point	  with	  a	  few	  of	  the	  various	  models	  of	  democracy:	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2.	   Marxist	  ⁄	  socialist	  ‘‘delegative’’	  which	  emphasizes	  substantive	  (rather	  than	  merely	  formal)	  democracy	  resulting	  from	  equalization	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  inequalities,	  as	  well	  as	  directly	  democratic	  and	  immediately	  revocable	  declarative	  form	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  (see	  for	  example,	  Mayo	  1955);	  and	  	  	  3.	   Social	  democratic,	  which	  works	  with	  some	  liberal	  democratic	  structures	  and	  procedures,	  but	  adds	  to	  them	  an	  emphasis	  on	  social	  sol-­‐	  idarity	  and	  development	  of	  institutional	  structures	  for	  democratic	  con-­‐	  trol	  over	  economic	  processes,	  notably	  over	  general	  wage	  levels	  (Tilton	  1991).	  	  Beyond	  these	  ‘‘standard	  models,’’	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  further	  models	  of	  democracy	  have	  been	  envisaged,	  notably:	  	  4.	   Participatory	  democracy,	  which	  challenges	  the	  hierarchical,	  infrequent	  and	  what	  is	  perceived	  as	  elitist	  forms	  of	  representation	  in	  liberal	  demo-­‐	  cratic	  systems	  and	  which	  puts	  emphasis	  on	  citizen	  empowerment	  and	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  civil	  society,	  the	  work	  place,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  public	  decision	  making	  (Pateman	  1970;	  Barber	  2003);	  	  5.	   Radical	  democracy,	  which	  emphasizes	  non-­‐hierarchical	  and	  nonstate-­‐	  based	  agonistic	  forms	  of	  democratic	  politics,	  focused	  often	  around	  social	  movement	  interactions	  (rather	  than	  party	  politics)	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  1985);	  	  6.	   Deliberative	  democracy.,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  generat-­‐	  ing	  more	  deliberative	  mechanisms	  in	  modern	  democratic	  systems,	  thus	  generating	  not	  only	  a	  greater	  role	  for	  citizens	  in	  democratic	  gover-­‐	  nance	  but	  also	  more	  effective	  and	  responsive	  forms	  of	  democratic	  state	  (Bohman	  and	  Rehg	  1997;	  Warren	  2008);	  and	  	  7.	   Cosmopolitan	  democracy,	  which	  emphasize	  the	  need,	  through	  various	  innovative	  mechanisms	  including	  global	  political	  parties	  and	  global	  forms	  of	  taxation,	  to	  democratize	  politics	  globally	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  to	  any	  meaningful	  sense	  of	  democracy	  within	  states	  (Patoma	  ̈ki	  and	  Teivainen	  2004).	  	  Beyond	  these	  models,	  various	  arguments	  for	  feminist,	  green	  and	  even	  Islamist	  and	  Confucian	  ideas	  of	  democracy	  have	  been	  made	  (see	  for	  example,	  Pateman	  1989;	  Sadiki	  2004;	  Bell	  2006;	  and	  Humphrey	  2007).	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  space	  we	  can-­‐	  not	  here	  examine	  all	  these	  models	  in	  detail:	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  detailed	  understand-­‐	  ing	  of	  these	  models	  one	  should	  turn	  to	  their	  advocates	  or	  a	  number	  of	  excellent	  texts	  reviewing	  a	  selection	  of	  them,	  for	  example,	  Mcpherson	  (1996,	  1977)	  or	  Held’s	  (1996)	  works.	  What	  is	  crucial	  for	  us	  to	  note,	  however,	  is	  that	  different	  models	  have	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significantly	  diverging	  views	  of	  how	  society	  is	  structured,	  how	  democracies	  function,	  and	  also	  of	  the	  normative	  justifications	  for	  democracy.	  (Kurki,	  372-­‐373)	  	  This	  list	  of	  different	  models	  is	  both	  daunting	  and	  instructive.	  	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  large	  variance	  between	  democracies	  and	  the	  ways	  that	  they	  can	  be	  judged.	  	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	  scale	  of	  liberal	  versus	  illiberal	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  ease,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  the	  policy	  makers	  (i.e.	  the	  Western	  Democratic	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe)	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  liberal	  versus	  illiberal	  democracy.	  	  
US	  Democratic	  Foreign	  Policy	  Objectives	  	  	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  there	  are	  several	  that	  aid,	  whether	  it	  is	  economic	  or	  military,	  is	  trying	  to	  achieve.	  	  The	  United	  States’	  Department	  of	  State	  website	  points	  out	  seven	  purposes	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Assistance.	  
1. Advance	  human	  rights	  and	  freedoms;	  2. Promote	  sustainable	  economic	  growth	  and	  reduce	  widespread	  poverty;	  3. Promote	  and	  support	  democratic,	  well-­‐governed	  states;	  4. Increase	  access	  to	  quality	  education,	  combat	  disease,	  and	  improve	  public	  health;	  5. Respond	  to	  urgent	  humanitarian	  needs;	  6. Prevent	  and	  respond	  to	  conflict;	  and	  7. Address	  transnational	  threats.	  (Director	  of	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Assistance)	  These	  different	  policy	  objectives	  reflects	  a	  variety	  of	  goals	  that	  are	  achievable	  through	  democratization,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  other	  goals	  in	  foreign	  assistance	  that	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do	  not	  necessarily	  parallel	  this	  democratic	  agenda	  such	  as	  goal	  number	  7	  of	  addressing	  transnational	  threats.	  	  Even	  with	  all	  of	  these	  other	  policy	  objectives,	  democracy	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  issue	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Foreign	  policy.	  	   Democracy	  is	  something	  that	  the	  United	  States	  upholds	  as	  a	  key	  form	  of	  government	  and	  they	  believe	  that	  states	  that	  do	  not	  have	  democracy	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  free.	  	  But	  a	  democratic	  system	  in	  itself	  represents	  more	  than	  just	  a	  type	  of	  government.	  	  The	  United	  States	  Government	  sees	  democracy	  as	  instrumental	  to	  not	  only	  providing	  freedoms	  to	  individuals,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  way	  to	  promote	  some	  of	  the	  other	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  mentioned	  above	  such	  as	  human	  rights,	  promoting	  education,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  	   During	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  (43),	  the	  stress	  on	  spreading	  democracy	  came	  to	  the	  forefront	  when	  he	  was	  talking	  about	  the	  war	  on	  terror	  and	  trying	  to	  promote	  democracy	  abroad	  following	  the	  September	  11th	  terrorist	  attacks.	  	  Paula	  J.	  Dobriansky,	  Undersecretary	  of	  State	  for	  Global	  Affair,	  wrote	  in	  Foreign	  Affairs	  about	  the	  different	  objectives	  that	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  was	  trying	  to	  promote	  through	  pushing	  democratic	  ideals.	  	  	  These	  objectives	  ranged	  from	  seeing	  democracy	  as	  a	  way	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  and	  spread	  human	  rights	  to	  promoting	  international	  security	  by	  seeing	  democratic	  governments	  as	  less	  likely	  to	  support	  terrorists	  like	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  through	  efforts	  in	  Iraq.	  	  	  As	  well	  as	  working	  together	  with	  other	  countries	  both	  bilaterally	  and	  multi-­‐laterally	  “a	  great	  deal	  of	  our	  multilateral	  diplomacy,	  including	  American	  engagement	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States,	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  imperatives	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  promotion”	  along	  with	  the	  UN	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Human	  Rights	  Commission	  and	  Community	  of	  Democracies	  among	  many	  other	  international	  ventures	  (Dobriansky,	  1).	  	  This	  goal	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  is	  not	  one	  just	  created	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  a	  goal	  that	  is	  international	  among	  other	  Western	  Democratic	  countries,	  which	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  later	  section.	  	  	  The	  same	  article	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  spreading	  democracy	  was	  seen	  also	  as	  a	  security	  objective:	  The	  administration's	  September	  2002	  National	  Security	  Strategy,	  which	  lays	  out	  our	  post-­‐September	  11	  strategic	  vision,	  prominently	  features	  democracy	  promotion.	  The	  strategy	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  core	  part	  of	  our	  overall	  national	  security	  doctrine	  and	  commit	  is	  us	  to	  help	  other	  countries	  realize	  their	  full	  potential:	  
In	  pursuit	  of	  our	  goals,	  our	  first	  imperative	  is	  to	  clarify	  what	  we	  stand	  for:	  the	  United	  States	  must	  defend	  liberty	  and	  justice	  because	  these	  principles	  are	  right	  and	  true	  for	  all	  people	  everywhere....	  America	  must	  stand	  firmly	  for	  the	  nonnegotiable	  demands	  of	  human	  dignity:	  the	  rule	  of	  law;	  limit	  is	  on	  the	  absolute	  power	  of	  the	  state;	  free	  speech;	  freedom	  of	  worship;	  equal	  justice;	  respect	  for	  women;	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  tolerance;	  and	  respect	  for	  private	  property.	  (Dobriansky)	  
There	  are	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  actual	  motivations	  behind	  the	  Bush	  objective	  of	  democracy	  promotion,	  but	  overall	  it	  was	  a	  large	  part	  of	  public	  speeches	  and	  supposedly	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  objectives.	  	  	  Some	  of	  the	  programs	  that	  the	  later	  Bush	  Administration	  set	  out	  are	  still	  working	  today	  in	  the	  quest	  to	  promote	  democracy	  through	  aid.	  	  One	  such	  program	  is	  the	  Millennium Challenge Cooperation or the MCC that has the expressed 
purpose of giving economic aid on the basis of having a stable democratic 
government.  During a conference that was held at Stanford in 2008, it was agreed that	  
“MCA/MCC funds are allocated on the basis of ex ante conditionality. 
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Countries must demonstrate their commitment to governing justly, 
investing in people, and promoting economic freedom by scoring 
relatively well on sixteen third party quantified indicators . . . Three of 
the six governing justly indicators are measures of democracy.” (Gordon) 
 
While the Millennium Challenge Account is technically a non-governmental 
organization, it is still allocating funds based on the goals set out by the United States 
government who was pushing such a strong pro democracy agenda under the Bush 
Administration and is mostly funded by the US Government, which would make it 
more of a neo non-governmental organization3. It has also been said that “AID 
[another United States aid program] currently has an explicit policy of directing more 
aid to countries that appear to be making greater progress towards democratization” 
(Finkel, 413).  Thus it comes a little surprise that the economic aid would be 
conditional upon democratization, but this same popular conditionality is also popping 
up across other international institutions including the World Bank (though it is 
important to note that the research of this paper does not deal with specifically 
conditional aid). 
 Of course it is also important to note that spreading democracy is not a venture 
purely created by the Bush Administration (43), but one that has been of concern to 
the United States with “steadily increasing level of democracy assistance programs 
from the U.S. since the end of the cold war” (Finkel, 403).  It is instead the selectivity 
and preference in the way that the aid is distributed that has changed. 
In the past two decades, foreign aid overall has become more selective in the 
following sense: in the second half of the 1980’s, aid was allocated in favor of 
countries with poor economic governance, as measured by an index of property 
rights and rule of law.  Aid was allocated in favor of democracies, but among 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  neo-­‐non	  governmental	  organization	  is an organization that is not formally tied to 
the government but receives government funding.	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low income countries there is not much relationship between democracy and 
economic governance. . . for multilateral assistance, significantly more aid is 
channeled to countries with good economic governance, the opposite of the 
case in the 1984-89 period. . . in the most recent period the latter has a slight 
relationship to good governance, but one that is not statistically different from 
zero (Dollar, 2044) 
 In	  fact,	  democratic	  aid	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  far	  back	  as	  following	  World	  War	  II	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  in	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  US	  assistance	  of	  newly	  formed	  democratic	  countries	  like	  Colombia	  and	  Venezuela	  in	  the	  1960’s	  (Diamond,	  26).	  	   There	  has	  been	  a	  thread	  of	  democratic	  promotion	  by	  the	  United	  States	  throughout	  our	  history,	  and	  most	  clearly	  seen	  from	  the	  period	  following	  World	  War	  II	  to	  the	  current	  War	  on	  Terror.	  It	  is	  evident	  not	  only	  in	  political	  speeches	  and	  rhetoric	  but	  also	  as	  conditions	  for	  screening	  and	  allocating	  aid.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  such	  aid	  allocation	  has	  changed	  as	  US	  goals	  have	  changed,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  a	  pretty	  constant	  stream	  throughout	  the	  United	  States	  political	  psyche	  over	  the	  past	  70	  years.	  	  	  World	  Democracy	  Promotion	  
	   While	  I	  talk	  in	  detail	  about	  US	  democracy	  promotion,	  these	  same	  values	  are	  reflected	  time	  and	  again	  in	  other	  Western	  democratic	  nations	  and	  around	  the	  world.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  shown	  in	  organizations	  like	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  World	  Bank	  that	  talk	  about	  promoting	  democracy,	  but	  also	  values	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties.	  	  More	  than	  the	  democratic	  regime	  itself,	  the	  rational	  behind	  democratic	  promotion,	  and	  the	  reason	  why	  so	  many	  developed	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democratic	  countries	  promote	  further	  democratization,	  include	  the	  factors	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  being	  a	  democracy.	  	   It	  is	  believed	  that	  there	  are	  many	  benefits	  to	  being	  a	  democracy	  that	  not	  only	  the	  developed	  democratic	  countries	  support.	  	  The	  populous	  in	  some	  non-­‐democratic	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  illiberal	  democratic	  countries,	  have	  also	  been	  pushing	  for	  democratic	  transition	  from	  within	  as	  was	  seen	  recently	  in	  the	  riots	  and	  protests	  that	  have	  been	  spreading	  across	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  There	  are	  reasons	  such	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  essential	  to	  the	  success	  of	  mankind	  and	  it	  is	  the	  democratic	  system	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  providing	  for	  these	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  ‘rational	  behind	  lending	  to	  democracies’	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  	   The	  European	  Union	  believes	  heavily	  in	  democracy	  promotion.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  all	  member	  states	  democratic,	  but	  also	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  membership	  is	  that	  the	  country	  must	  be	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  (Schimmelfennig,	  495).	  	  	  The	  EU	  also	  funds	  various	  organizations	  and	  groups	  that	  are	  supporting	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy.	  With	  a	  budget	  of	  €1.1	  billion	  between	  2007	  and	  2013,	  the	  European	  Instrument	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  supports	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations.	  In	  particular	  it	  supports	  those	  promoting	  human	  rights,	  democracy	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law;	  abolishing	  the	  death	  penalty;	  combating	  torture;	  and	  fighting	  racism	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  discrimination.	  (European	  Union	  External	  Action)	  	  	  The	  European	  Union	  supports	  democracy	  within	  their	  own	  borders	  and	  are	  active	  supporters	  of	  spreading	  democracy	  abroad	  through	  EU	  programs.	  	  The	  European	  Union	  also	  supports	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  are	  active	  in	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trying	  to	  promote	  the	  values	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  democracy.	  	   The	  United	  Nations,	  a	  compounding	  of	  world	  interests	  through	  its	  representation	  of	  so	  many	  different	  states	  from	  around	  the	  world,	  also	  takes	  a	  very	  strong	  democratic	  stance;	  even	  though	  several	  of	  it	  is	  members	  are	  non-­‐democratic.	  	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  United	  Nations’	  Democracy	  Fund	  (UNDEF)	  as	  well	  as	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  and	  others	  that	  are	  explicitly	  created	  to	  promote	  the	  values	  that	  are	  often	  linked	  to	  democracy.	  UNDEF	  was	  established	  by	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  2005	  as	  a	  United	  Nations	  General	  Trust	  Fund	  to	  support	  democratization	  efforts	  around	  the	  world.	  UNDEF	  supports	  projects	  that	  strengthen	  the	  voice	  of	  civil	  society,	  promote	  human	  rights,	  and	  encourage	  the	  participation	  of	  all	  groups	  in	  democratic	  processes.	  The	  large	  majority	  of	  UNDEF	  funds	  go	  to	  local	  civil	  society	  organizations	  -­‐-­‐	  both	  in	  the	  transition	  and	  consolidation	  phases	  of	  democratization.	  In	  this	  way,	  UNDEF	  plays	  a	  novel	  and	  unique	  role	  in	  complementing	  the	  UN's	  traditional	  work	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  work	  with	  Governments	  -­‐-­‐	  to	  strengthen	  democratic	  governance	  around	  the	  world.	  UNDEF	  subsists	  entirely	  on	  voluntary	  contributions	  from	  Governments;	  in	  2010,	  it	  surpassed	  110	  million	  dollars	  in	  contributions	  and	  now	  counts	  39	  countries	  as	  donors,	  including	  many	  middle-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  States	  in	  Africa,	  Asia	  and	  Latin	  America.	  .	  .	  	  	  UNDEF	  projects	  are	  two	  years	  long	  and	  fall	  under	  one	  or	  more	  of	  six	  main	  areas:	  ·	  Community	  development	  	  ·	  Rule	  of	  law	  and	  human	  rights	  ·	  Tools	  for	  democratization	  ·	  Women	  	  ·	  Youth	  	  ·	  Media	  	  (UNDEF)	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The	  UNDEF	  is	  one	  example	  of	  many	  different	  international	  cooperative	  organizations	  that	  explicitly	  support	  the	  promotion	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  democratic	  institutions.	  	   Democratic	  nations	  and	  regions	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  pro	  democracy	  as	  well,	  as	  seen	  through	  actions	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  by	  regions	  like	  Latin	  America,	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  even	  the	  Middle	  East	  that	  claim	  to	  be	  very	  supportive	  of	  democracy.	  	  There	  is	  a	  trend	  to	  support	  democracy,	  and	  almost	  every	  country	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  says	  that	  they	  support	  democracy,	  even	  if	  the	  reality	  of	  their	  own	  political	  institutions	  might	  not	  reflect	  actual	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  There	  are	  efforts	  to	  promote	  democracy	  on	  almost	  every	  continent,	  and	  with	  many	  of	  the	  richest	  nations	  being	  democratic	  and	  contributing	  to	  aid	  such	  as	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  and	  other	  organizations	  that	  specifically	  promote	  democracy,	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  that	  there	  would	  be	  the	  same	  values	  reflected	  in	  the	  aid	  distribution	  itself.	  	  
Official	  Development	  Assistance	  	   Official	  Development	  Assistance	  is	  defined	  as:	  	   Flows	  of	  official	  financing	  administered	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  economic	  development	  and	  welfare	  of	  developing	  countries	  as	  the	  main	  objective,	  and	  which	  are	  concessional	  in	  character	  with	  a	  grant	  element	  of	  at	  least	  25	  percent	  (using	  a	  fixed	  10	  percent	  rate	  of	  discount).	  By	  convention,	  ODA	  flows	  comprise	  contributions	  of	  donor	  government	  agencies,	  at	  all	  levels,	  to	  developing	  countries	  (“bilateral	  ODA”)	  and	  to	  multilateral	  institutions.	  ODA	  receipts	  comprise	  disbursements	  by	  bilateral	  donors	  and	  multilateral	  institutions.	  Lending	  by	  export	  credit	  agencies—with	  the	  pure	  purpose	  of	  export	  promotion—is	  excluded.	  	   (OECD	  Glossary	  of	  Statistical	  Terms)	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The	  international	  community,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  more	  nuanced	  definition	  of	  Official	  Development	  Assistance,	  placed	  limits	  on	  reporting	  as	  presented	  below.	  	  This	  is	  often	  the	  decisive	  criterion	  for	  determining	  ODA	  eligibility.	  	  In	  the	  final	  analysis	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  intention.	  	  But	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  scope	  or	  subjective	  interpretations	  and	  promote	  comparable	  reporting,	  Members	  have	  agreed	  to	  limit	  is	  on	  ODA	  reporting	  e.g.:	  	  •	   Exclusion	  of	  military	  aid	  -­‐	  The	  supply	  of	  military	  equipment	  and	  services,	  and	  the	  forgiveness	  of	  debts	  incurred	  for	  military	  purposes,	  are	  not	  reportable	  as	  ODA.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  additional	  costs	  incurred	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  donor’s	  military	  forces	  to	  deliver	  humanitarian	  aid	  or	  perform	  development	  services	  are	  ODA-­‐eligible.	  	  •	   Peacekeeping	  -­‐	  The	  enforcement	  aspects	  of	  peacekeeping	  are	  not	  reportable	  as	  ODA.	  However,	  ODA	  does	  include	  the	  net	  bilateral	  costs	  to	  donors	  of	  carrying	  out	  the	  following	  activities	  within	  UN-­‐administered	  or	  UN-­‐approved	  peace	  operations:	  human	  rights,	  election	  monitoring,	  rehabilitation	  of	  demobilised	  soldiers	  and	  of	  national	  infrastructure,	  monitoring	  and	  training	  of	  administrators,	  including	  customs	  and	  police	  officers,	  advice	  on	  economic	  stabilisation,	  repatriation	  and	  demobilisation	  of	  soldiers,	  weapons	  disposal	  and	  mine	  removal.	  (Net	  bilateral	  costs	  means	  the	  extra	  costs	  of	  assigning	  personnel	  to	  these	  activities,	  net	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  stationing	  them	  at	  home,	  and	  of	  any	  compensation	  received	  from	  the	  UN.)	  Similar	  activities	  conducted	  for	  developmental	  reasons	  outside	  UN	  peace	  operations	  are	  also	  reportable	  as	  ODA,	  but	  not	  recorded	  against	  the	  peacekeeping	  code.	  Activities	  carried	  out	  for	  non-­‐developmental	  reasons,	  e.g.	  mine	  clearance	  to	  allow	  military	  training,	  are	  not	  reportable	  as	  ODA.	  	  •	   Civil	  police	  work	  -­‐	  Expenditure	  on	  police	  training	  is	  reportable	  as	  ODA,	  unless	  the	  training	  relates	  to	  paramilitary	  functions	  such	  as	  counter-­‐insurgency	  work	  or	  intelligence	  gathering	  on	  terrorism.	  The	  supply	  of	  the	  donor’s	  police	  services	  to	  control	  civil	  disobedience	  is	  not	  reportable.	  	  •	   Social	  and	  cultural	  programmes	  -­‐	  As	  with	  police	  work,	  a	  distinction	  is	  drawn	  between	  building	  developing	  countries’	  capacity	  (ODA-­‐eligible)	  and	  one-­‐off	  interventions	  (not	  ODA-­‐eligible).	  Thus,	  the	  promotion	  of	  museums,	  libraries,	  art	  and	  music	  schools,	  and	  sports	  training	  facilities	  and	  venues	  counts	  as	  ODA,	  whereas	  sponsoring	  concert	  tours	  or	  athletes’	  travel	  costs	  does	  not.	  Cultural	  programmes	  in	  developing	  countries	  whose	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  culture	  or	  values	  of	  the	  donor	  are	  not	  reportable	  as	  ODA.	  	  •	   Assistance	  to	  refugees	  -­‐	  Assistance	  to	  refugees	  in	  developing	  countries	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is	  reportable	  as	  ODA.	  Temporary	  assistance	  to	  refugees	  from	  developing	  countries	  arriving	  in	  donor	  countries	  is	  reportable	  as	  ODA	  during	  the	  first	  12	  months	  of	  stay,	  and	  all	  costs	  associated	  with	  eventual	  repatriation	  to	  the	  developing	  country	  of	  origin	  are	  also	  reportable.	  	  •	   Nuclear	  energy	  -­‐	  The	  peaceful	  use	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  including	  construction	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  nuclear	  safety	  and	  the	  medical	  use	  of	  radioisotopes,	  is	  ODA-­‐eligible.	  Military	  applications	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  nuclear	  non-­‐proliferation	  activities	  are	  not.	  	  •	   Research	  -­‐	  Only	  research	  directly	  and	  primarily	  relevant	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  developing	  countries	  may	  be	  counted	  as	  ODA.	  This	  includes	  research	  into	  tropical	  diseases	  and	  developing	  crops	  designed	  for	  developing	  country	  conditions.	  The	  costs	  may	  still	  be	  counted	  as	  ODA	  if	  the	  research	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  developed	  country.	  	  •Anti-­‐Terrorism	  -­‐	  Activities	  combating	  terrorism	  are	  not	  reportable	  as	  ODA,	  as	  they	  generally	  target	  perceived	  threats	  to	  donor,	  as	  much	  as	  to	  recipient	  countries,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  of	  the	  recipient.	  	  	  	  (OECD:	  Is	  It	  ODA?)	  	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  is	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  developing	  countries	  and	  allowing	  them	  to	  expand	  economically	  and	  hopefully	  promote	  a	  stronger	  more	  self-­‐sufficient	  country.	  	  ODA	  is	  even	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  end	  world	  poverty	  by	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  In	  their	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals,	  the	  UN	  set	  out	  the	  goal	  of	  setting	  forth	  “0.7%	  of	  rich-­‐countries'	  gross	  national	  product	  (GNP)	  to	  Official	  Development	  Assistance”	  (Millennium	  Project)	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  it	  would	  bring	  enough	  economic	  development	  that	  the	  poorest	  countries	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  poorest	  citizens.	  	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  definition,	  ODA	  is	  disbursed	  by	  donor	  government	  agencies	  to	  the	  beneficiary	  governments	  and	  multilateral	  institutions.	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  aid	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  purely	  for	  the	  economic	  welfare	  of	  the	  beneficiary	  country,	  thus	  the	  reason	  for	  all	  of	  the	  exemptions.	  	  Yet	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  also	  serves	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  developed	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countries	  as	  well	  to	  the	  donors	  are	  providing	  these	  funds	  to	  the	  developing	  countries.	  	  	   With	  the	  United	  States	  being	  the	  largest	  ODA	  donor,	  lending	  almost	  twice	  as	  much	  as	  the	  next	  largest	  aid	  donor,	  these	  democratic	  policies	  and	  objectives	  should	  show	  up	  in	  the	  data	  based	  on	  aid	  allocations.	  	  Other	  w=Western	  democratic	  countries	  should	  follow	  suit,	  and	  making	  up	  the	  largest	  portion	  of	  ODA	  donors,	  their	  policies	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  should	  be	  more	  represented	  within	  the	  ODA	  lending	  patterns.	  	  While	  ODA	  includes	  lending	  non-­‐democratic	  as	  well	  as	  illiberal	  democratic	  countries,	  these	  countries	  account	  for	  a	  rather	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  ODA	  funding.	  	  So	  even	  if	  the	  non-­‐democratic	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  policy	  objectives	  of	  democracy	  promotion,	  their	  small	  amount	  of	  lending	  with	  different	  objectives	  shouldn’t	  hide	  a	  preference	  for	  democracy	  within	  the	  overall	  ODA	  data,	  if	  there	  is	  one.	  
 
Rational Behind Lending to Democracies and Aid Effectiveness 	   Winston	  Churchill	  is	  often	  recognized	  for	  his	  quote	  saying	  	  Many	  forms	  of	  Government	  have	  been	  tried,	  and	  will	  be	  tried	  in	  this	  world	  of	  sin	  and	  woe.	  No	  one	  pretends	  that	  democracy	  is	  perfect	  or	  all-­‐wise.	  Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  said	  that	  democracy	  is	  the	  worst	  form	  of	  government	  except	  all	  those	  other	  forms	  that	  have	  been	  tried	  from	  time	  to	  time	  (Hansard,	  November	  11,	  1947).	  	  	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  efficient	  aid	  allocation,	  the	  research	  that	  I	  have	  seen	  suggests	  that	  Winston	  Churchill	  is	  correct	  and	  that	  democratic	  governments	  distribute	  aid	  
	   20	  
better	  than	  the	  rest,	  which	  is	  yet	  another	  reason	  for	  preference	  in	  aid	  distribution	  to	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  question,	  why	  democracy?	  	  	  	   Aid	  effectiveness	  has	  been	  an	  issue	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  discussions	  on	  how	  to	  not	  only	  distribute	  aid	  effectively,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  aid	  simply	  getting	  allocated	  to	  the	  purposes	  it	  was	  meant	  for	  and	  serving	  the	  people	  effectively.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  views	  good	  governance,	  particularly	  that	  democratic	  nations	  as	  more	  prone	  to	  good	  governance,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  better	  distribute	  aid	  and	  have	  more	  meaningful	  progress	  towards	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  aid,	  but	  there	  are	  other	  rationales	  at	  play	  as	  well	  (Santiso,	  5).	  	  	  This	  goal	  of	  good	  governance	  is	  a	  way	  of	  promoting	  not	  only	  better	  aid	  allocation,	  but	  also	  furthers	  the	  perception	  that	  democratic	  regimes	  are	  better	  than	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes.	  	   There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  and	  data	  on	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  aid.	  	  This	  research	  examines	  and	  seeks	  to	  explain	  why	  	  aid	  does	  not	  get	  to	  where	  it	  is	  directed,	  often	  finding	  that	  aid	  being	  used	  by	  corrupt	  officials	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  gains.	  	  Authors	  including	  Santiso	  (2003),	  Killick	  (1997),	  Dreher	  (2004),	  Vaubel	  (2004),	  Schimmelfnnig	  (2003),	  Engert	  (2003),	  Knobel	  (2003),	  Ramcharan	  (2002),	  Svensson	  (2002),	  Nunnenkamp	  (2010)	  and	  Ohler	  (2010)	  are	  just	  a	  few	  who	  have	  undertaken	  studies	  that	  found	  aid	  allocation	  to	  be	  ineffective	  regardless	  of	  the	  different	  efforts	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  of	  inefficient	  aid	  allocation.	  	  These	  individuals	  and	  other	  researchers	  show	  a	  deep	  skepticism	  for	  aid	  allocation	  in	  itself	  and	  how	  much	  good	  it	  is	  actually	  doing	  when	  it	  is	  not	  reaching	  the	  people	  it	  was	  targeted	  to	  help.	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   Even	  with	  data	  that	  suggests	  that	  aid	  is	  ineffective,	  there	  is	  still	  hope	  for	  some	  effective	  allocation.	  	  There	  have	  been	  several	  studies	  conducted	  that	  also	  found	  that	  while	  aid	  allocation	  is	  often	  ineffective,	  when	  comparing	  democratic	  regimes	  with	  non	  democratic	  countries,	  they	  found	  that	  democratic	  countries	  have	  a	  much	  higher	  chance	  of	  having	  aid	  allocated	  to	  the	  people	  it	  was	  targeted	  for.	  	  Such	  optimistic	  authors	  include:	  Svensson	  (2002),	  Finkel	  (2007),	  Linan(2007),	  Seligson(2007),	  Knack	  (2004),	  Pritchett	  (198),	  Kaufmann	  (1998),	  Lipset	  (1959),	  Kosack	  (2003),	  Roodman	  (2007),	  Levitisky	  (2005),	  Way	  (2005),	  Morrison	  (2007),	  Plar	  (2007),	  Burnell	  (2004),	  Ross	  (2006),	  Owusu	  (1998)	  and	  Iimi	  (1998).	  	  These	  authors	  are	  but	  a	  few	  that	  found	  that	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  are	  better	  at	  allocating	  aid	  effectively	  than	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  illiberal	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  Michael	  Ross	  states	  that,	  “there	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  democracies	  fund	  public	  services	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  than	  non	  democracies”	  (Ross,	  860)	  and	  this	  whole	  concept	  is	  great	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  giving	  out	  aid.	  	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  giving	  out	  aid	  is	  to	  make	  a	  difference,	  and	  when	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  invest	  in	  greater	  amounts	  towards	  the	  public	  than	  other	  regime	  types,	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  is	  a	  clear	  ringer	  for	  preferring	  countries	  that	  are	  democratic	  over	  those	  that	  are	  not.	  Amartya	  Sen	  illustrates	  that	  there	  are	  three	  rationales	  for	  promoting	  democracy:	  The	  first	  argument	  is	  that	  democracies,	  through	  the	  electoral	  process,	  allow	  the	  poor	  to	  penalize	  governments	  that	  allow	  famines	  to	  occur;	  and	  political	  leaders,	  acting	  strategically,	  will	  therefore	  try	  to	  avert	  famine.	  .	  .	  Sen’s	  second	  argument	  is	  that	  democracies	  are	  better	  than	  non	  democracies	  at	  transmitting	  information	  from	  poor	  and	  remote	  areas	  to	  the	  central	  government,	  thanks	  to	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  .	  .	  .	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and	  the	  third	  theory	  suggests	  that	  democracies	  tend	  to	  help	  the	  poor	  by	  producing	  more	  public	  goods,	  and	  more	  income	  redistribution,	  than	  non	  democracies.	  (Ross,	  861-­‐862)	  	  These	  rationales	  are	  often	  what	  motivate	  the	  preference	  for	  democratic	  systems.	  Democratic	  regimes	  seem	  far	  better	  equipped	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  and	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  them,	  thus	  promoting	  the	  ideals	  behind	  the	  aid	  as	  well	  as	  getting	  the	  aid	  out	  to	  the	  people	  it	  concerns.	  	  	  However,	  even	  with	  this	  rationale	  behind	  preferring	  to	  lend	  to	  democratic	  countries	  over	  those	  that	  are	  not,	  “it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  these	  infusions	  of	  money	  actually	  reach	  the	  poor;	  nor	  is	  it	  obvious	  that	  they	  produce	  better	  social	  outcomes”	  (Ross,	  860).	  	  	  Even	  though	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  prefer	  lending	  to	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes,	  there	  is	  still	  no	  clear	  evidence	  showing	  that	  the	  aid	  sent	  to	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  is	  better	  allocated	  and	  reaches	  the	  people	  better	  compared	  to	  other	  regime	  types.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  view	  that	  trying	  to	  tinker	  with	  the	  institutions	  of	  state	  is	  not	  an	  optimal	  way	  to	  democratize	  regimes	  that	  fall	  short	  of	  being	  full	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  That	  approach	  can	  all	  too	  easily	  be	  co-­‐opted	  by	  a	  regime	  that	  has	  no	  intention	  of	  going	  the	  full	  distance,	  but	  is	  only	  interested	  in	  partial	  liberalization	  –	  making	  concessions	  to	  buy	  time	  and	  to	  deflect	  pressure	  for	  more	  substantial	  political	  change	  (Burnell,	  110)	  	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  my	  research	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  efforts	  to	  turn	  non-­‐democratic	  countries	  into	  full	  on	  democracies	  causes	  more	  harm	  than	  good.	  	  In	  fact,	  this	  lending	  pattern	  can	  result	  in	  lack	  luster	  progress	  which	  is	  only	  enough	  to	  appease	  the	  lenders	  into	  giving	  them	  more	  aid	  while	  not	  achieving	  meaningful	  democratization.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  allocating	  aid	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  assertion	  that	  countries	  who	  are	  moving	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towards	  democratization	  receive	  more	  aid	  (something	  that	  I	  will	  be	  addressing	  in	  my	  paper).	  Kanck	  claims	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  “AID	  currently	  has	  an	  explicit	  policy	  of	  directing	  more	  aid	  to	  counties	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  making	  greater	  progress	  towards	  democratization”	  .	  .	  .[though	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  this	  is	  even	  the	  case]	  (Finkel,	  413)	  	  	   Even	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  democratic	  countries	  are	  better	  at	  allocating	  aid,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  can	  be	  harm	  done	  through	  democratic	  promotion	  as	  well.	  	  Larry	  Diamond	  in	  his	  article	  “Promoting	  Democracy”	  is	  one	  author	  who	  explains	  that	  democracy	  promotion,	  and	  specifically	  “Western”	  style	  democracy	  promotion	  is	  harmful.	  	  ‘Promoting’	  democracy	  does	  not	  mean	  ‘exporting’	  it.	  	  Except	  in	  rare	  instances,	  democracy	  does	  not	  work	  when	  foreign	  models	  are	  imposed,	  and	  many	  features	  of	  American	  democracy	  are	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  poor,	  unstable,	  and	  divided	  countries.	  	  Moreover,	  a	  missionary	  zeal	  for	  America’s	  specific	  institutions	  and	  practices	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  provoke	  resentment	  than	  admiration	  (Diamond,	  1)	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  West’s	  support	  and	  promotion	  of	  capitalist	  ideals	  are	  not	  only	  non-­‐democratic	  in	  nature,	  but	  are	  also	  potentially	  harmful.	  This	  support	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  ideals	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  current	  model	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  carried	  out	  by	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  for	  countries	  that	  simply	  weren’t	  ready	  yet	  to	  take	  on	  such	  models	  of	  governance.	  	   There	  has	  been	  research	  into	  this	  matter	  of	  democratization	  and	  the	  structural	  aspects	  that	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  such	  transformations.	  	  One	  author	  finds	  the	  structural	  conditions	  towards	  democratization	  to	  actually	  be	  counterproductive	  and	  even	  harmful	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Africa.	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  
	   24	  
democratization	  itself,	  he	  find	  the	  means	  of	  allocation	  and	  aid	  allocated	  as	  being	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  contributors	  to	  the	  struggle	  to	  build	  African	  democracy	  and	  points	  at	  the	  donor	  countries,	  which	  are	  often	  former	  colonial	  powers,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  forces	  acting	  against	  the	  success	  of	  African	  democratization.	  	  He	  concludes	  his	  article	  by	  saying	  Africans	  who	  have	  been	  struggling	  to	  bring	  democracy	  to	  their	  societies	  are	  now	  finding	  themselves	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  growing	  international	  sympathy	  and	  support.	  	  All	  too	  often,	  however,	  well-­‐wishers	  of	  African	  democracy	  in	  the	  West	  have	  been	  led	  astray	  by	  insensitivity	  to	  local	  conditions	  and	  erroneous	  theories	  (like	  those	  underlying	  the	  imposition	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  programs).	  	  Misguided	  support,	  however	  sincere,	  is	  bound	  to	  prove	  counterproductive.	  	  The	  West	  must	  guard	  against	  this	  by	  recognizing	  that	  Africa’s	  democrats	  know	  what	  they	  are	  doing,	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  helped	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  agenda.	  (Ake,	  44)	  	  	  Along	  with	  considering	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  Western	  democratic	  promotion	  in	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  receiving	  the	  aid,	  there	  are	  also	  objections	  and	  questions	  about	  how	  much	  the	  aid	  helps	  to	  further	  the	  donor	  countries’	  goals.	  	   There	  was	  an	  article	  that	  questioned	  the	  “premises	  of	  democracy	  promotion”	  (Goldsmith,	  120)	  and	  found	  some	  severe	  flaws	  in	  the	  rationale	  of	  it.	  The	  rationale	  for	  blanket	  democratization	  is	  mistaken	  on	  two	  counts:	  it	  fails	  to	  differentiate	  sufficiently	  between	  partial	  and	  full	  democracy,	  and	  it	  glosses	  over	  the	  challenge	  of	  helping	  authoritarian	  countries	  avoid	  the	  first	  and	  obtain	  the	  latter.	  	  At	  issue	  is	  not	  the	  goal	  of	  expanding	  he	  number	  of	  constitutional	  representative	  political	  systems	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Such	  systems	  are	  fine	  in	  concept,	  but	  the	  preponderance	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  shows	  that	  means	  do	  not	  exist	  to	  produce	  more	  of	  this	  type	  of	  government	  consistently	  from	  outside.	  	  Awareness	  about	  the	  alternative	  likelihood	  of	  harmful	  consequences,	  especially	  in	  the	  short	  and	  medium	  term,	  is	  critical.	  (Goldsmith,	  145)	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His	  objections	  to	  democracy	  promotion	  are	  not	  based	  on	  the	  values	  that	  they	  promote,	  but	  on	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  aid	  distribution	  itself.	  	  Rather	  than	  feeding	  the	  stable,	  effective	  liberal	  democracies,	  the	  ones	  with	  civil	  liberties	  and	  human	  rights,	  it	  is	  supporting	  the	  illiberal	  democracies.	  	  The	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  aid	  does	  not	  get	  the	  illiberal	  democratic	  regimes	  to	  transition	  to	  more	  liberal	  ones.	  	  This	  reality	  is	  potentially	  harmful	  to	  the	  hopes	  of	  promoting	  future	  strong	  democratic	  regimes	  instead	  of	  supporting	  the	  countries	  that	  wish	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  and,	  as	  I	  will	  point	  out	  later,	  it	  is	  also	  potentially	  threatening	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  country	  in	  itself.	   	  	  
Democratic	  Peace	  Theory	  and	  Country	  Stability	  
	  
	   Another	  reason	  that	  states	  promote	  democracy	  is	  that	  it	  will	  reduce	  the	  possibility	  of	  international	  conflicts.	  	  This	  is	  based	  on	  democratic	  peace	  theory,	  which	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  democratic	  countries	  do	  not	  fight	  one	  another.	  	  This	  theory	  was	  first	  proposed	  by	  Immanual	  Kant	  in	  his	  essay	  “Perpetual	  Peace”	  written	  in	  1795,	  even	  though	  he	  does	  not	  often	  receive	  credit	  for	  his	  assertion,	  and	  has	  since	  been	  studied	  and	  promoted	  by	  other	  authors	  as	  well	  (though	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  he	  addressed	  liberal	  states	  rather	  than	  democratic	  countries	  specifically).	  	  	  Such	  authors	  include	  Small	  (1976),	  Singer	  (1976),	  Doyle	  (1983),	  Rummel	  (2005),	  Maoz	  (1993),	  Abdolai	  (1989),	  Russett	  (1995),	  Köchler	  (1995),	  Ray	  (2003).	  	  This	  assertion	  of	  democratic	  peace	  has	  been	  a	  popular	  one.	  	  As	  John	  Owen	  points	  out:	  	  ‘Democracies	  do	  not	  attack	  each	  other,’	  President	  Clinton	  declared	  in	  his	  1994	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address,	  meaning	  that	  ‘ultimately	  the	  best	  strategy	  to	  insure	  our	  security	  and	  to	  build	  a	  durable	  peace	  is	  to	  support	  the	  advance	  of	  democracy	  elsewhere.	  (Owen,	  87)	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   While	  Democratic	  Peace	  Theory	  in	  itself	  seems	  sound,	  there	  are	  various	  authors	  who	  have	  also	  pointed	  out	  objections	  to	  this	  theory,	  authors	  including	  Owen	  (1994),	  Senese	  (1999),	  Chan	  (1997),	  Rosato	  (2003),	  and	  Kurki	  (2010).	  	  	  They	  believe	  that	  it	  should	  instead	  be	  applied	  on	  a	  smaller	  scope	  and	  limited	  to	  encompass	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  Although	  there	  are	  various	  theories	  about	  what	  aspects	  of	  liberal	  democracies	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  peace4,	  it	  is	  relatively	  uncontested	  that	  liberal	  democracies	  have	  not	  historically	  fought	  with	  one	  another.	  	  This	  has	  often	  led	  to	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  democracy	  promotion	  in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  why	  democratic	  nations	  are	  seen	  as	  the	  political	  ideal.	  	  However,	  an	  important	  aspect	  that	  should	  be	  noted	  -­‐-­‐	  it	  is	  often	  their	  stability,	  not	  democracy,	  that	  is	  attributed	  to	  this	  ability	  to	  maintain	  peaceful	  relations	  with	  other	  such	  countries.	  	   One	  such	  model	  (below)	  that	  is	  often	  used	  to	  explain	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  J-­‐curve	  proposed	  by	  Ian	  Bremmer	  in	  his	  book	  “The	  J	  Curve,	  a	  New	  Way	  to	  Understand	  Why	  Nations	  Rise	  and	  Fall.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  *Some	  explinations	  are	  that	  democratic	  countries	  are	  economically	  linked	  together	  and	  so	  are	  unlikely	  to	  fight	  with	  one	  another	  because	  it	  would	  not	  be	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  lose	  trading	  partners.	  	  	  *Another	  explination	  is	  that	  democratic	  institutions	  are	  more	  responsive	  to	  their	  people	  and	  held	  accountable	  so	  they	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  fighting.	  	  	  *A	  third	  explination	  is	  that	  the	  norms	  of	  a	  democratic	  system	  itself	  encourages	  negotiation	  and	  compromise	  resulting	  in	  more	  peaceful	  conclusions	  to	  conflict.	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(Kidd)	  
	  Bremmer	  discovered	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  for	  two	  types	  of	  regimes	  to	  be	  stable;	  that	  of	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  and	  the	  most	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  The	  graph	  shows	  a	  relationship	  between	  stability	  (the	  most	  stable	  countries	  being	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  break	  down	  in	  civil	  strife	  and	  have	  fighting	  within	  the	  country)	  and	  openness	  (how	  restrictive	  or	  open	  a	  country	  is	  with	  authoritarian	  states	  being	  the	  least	  open	  and	  liberal	  democracies	  being	  the	  most	  open	  states).	  	  This	  model	  has	  been	  backed	  up	  not	  only	  by	  Bremmer’s	  research,	  but	  has	  also	  been	  furthered	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Paul	  Senese	  (1999)	  who	  takes	  the	  model	  to	  another	  level	  to	  also	  include	  maturity	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Senese	  points	  out	  that	  	  Joint	  democracy	  imparts	  disparate	  effects	  on	  the	  hostility	  intensification	  of	  disputes,	  in	  terms	  of	  direction	  and	  magnitude,	  depending	  on	  maturity	  levels.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  joint	  maturity	  impact	  is	  contingent	  on	  democracy	  level”	  (Senese,	  483)	  	  	  He	  found	  that	  not	  only	  are	  the	  more	  stable	  democracies	  more	  peaceful,	  but	  also	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  the	  country	  has	  been	  democratic	  impacts	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  country	  will	  go	  to	  war.	  	  This	  has	  aid	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  persuading	  the	  country	  to	  become	  democratic	  and	  encouraging	  it	  to	  remain	  a	  liberal	  democracy	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in	  order	  to	  assure	  real	  stability	  and	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  of	  that	  country	  having	  violent	  conflicts.	  Stability	  in	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  countries,	  paired	  with	  evidence	  that	  aid	  distribution	  is	  most	  effective	  and	  efficient	  in	  the	  liberal	  democracies,	  would	  imply	  that	  the	  policy	  goals	  would	  be	  to	  get	  countries	  to	  liberalize.	  	  The	  model	  would	  suggest	  that	  becoming	  democratic	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  be	  a	  stable	  country	  with	  good	  governance.	  	  	  Rather,	  being	  a	  liberal	  democracy,	  	  where	  the	  countries	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  peaceful	  influence	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  go	  to	  war,	  would	  be	  the	  more	  beneficial	  choice	  for	  aid	  and	  the	  future	  stability	  of	  a	  country.	  Bremmer’s	  model	  would	  also	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  move	  counties	  out	  of	  the	  middle	  range,	  where	  there	  is	  the	  highest	  chance	  of	  conflict	  (so	  countries	  that	  are	  less	  authoritarian	  all	  the	  way	  up	  to	  being	  illiberal	  democracies)	  and	  try	  to	  get	  them	  to	  either	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum	  where	  they	  are	  more	  stable	  (aka	  the	  authoritarian	  and	  or	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes).	  With	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  are	  illiberal	  democracies	  rising	  and	  leaving	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  nations	  in	  that	  dangerous,	  in	  between	  stage	  of	  being	  neither	  truly	  authoritarian	  nor	  truly	  liberal	  democracies,	  it	  can	  imply	  that	  these	  are	  the	  most	  at	  risk	  nations	  for	  strife.	  	  Perhaps	  current	  trends	  of	  revolution	  and	  fighting	  in	  the	  streets	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  danger	  of	  being	  in	  that	  middle	  range,	  as	  we	  have	  lately	  seen	  with	  countries	  like	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  and	  even	  Libya.	  	  From	  all	  of	  this,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  goals	  of	  aid	  should	  be	  to	  encourage	  countries	  to	  move	  towards	  being	  liberal	  democracies	  and	  thus	  lead	  to	  meaningful	  stability.	  	  That	  is	  the	  range	  in	  which	  the	  UN	  goals	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	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States	  policy	  goals	  will	  be	  met	  of	  stability,	  economic	  strength,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  civil	  liberties	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Also	  with	  this	  trend,	  it	  would	  suggest	  that	  donor	  countries	  and	  institutions	  should	  have	  a	  preference	  in	  aid	  for	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  countries,	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  trying	  to	  move	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  openness	  scale	  towards	  being	  liberal	  democracies.	  In	  summary,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  am	  considering	  two	  different	  types	  of	  democracies,	  those	  that	  are	  liberal	  democracies	  like	  the	  Western	  European	  democratic	  countries	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  countries	  that	  are	  illiberal	  such	  as	  Egypt	  and	  most	  of	  Africa.	  	  The	  United	  States	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Western	  Democratic	  countries	  have	  all	  been	  promoting	  democratization	  and	  have	  policies	  and	  programs	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  fostering	  democratic	  transitions	  around	  the	  world.	  	  While	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  is	  not	  specifically	  targeted	  at	  democratization,	  it	  should	  reflect	  the	  policies	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  donor	  countries	  that	  mostly	  have	  pro-­‐democracy	  agendas	  with	  liberal	  democratic	  countries	  making	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  money	  lent.	  	  On	  top	  of	  having	  political	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  democracy,	  there	  are	  also	  the	  matters	  of	  aid	  effectiveness	  and	  aid	  being	  better	  distributed	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  countries	  than	  in	  non-­‐democratic	  countries.	  	  These	  findings	  that	  liberal	  democracies	  are	  better	  distributing	  the	  aid	  illustrates	  yet	  another	  reason	  for	  preferring	  to	  give	  aid	  to	  liberal	  democratic	  countries	  over	  that	  of	  less	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  Finally,	  under	  the	  J-­‐Curve	  and	  Democratic	  Peace	  theory,	  we	  find	  that	  it	  is	  best	  to	  have	  countries	  either	  be	  complete	  liberal	  democracies	  or	  authoritarian	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  a	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country.	  	  Given	  the	  trend	  of	  Democratic	  Peace	  theory,	  where	  liberal	  democracies	  do	  not	  fight	  one	  another,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  liberal	  democracies	  would	  be	  the	  best	  goal	  to	  shoot	  for	  in	  terms	  of	  peace,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  goals	  as	  well	  as	  effective	  aid	  distribution.	  
	  
III.	  Hypothesis	  My	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  preference	  in	  aid	  allocation	  to	  countries	  that	  are	  moving	  towards	  democratization	  over	  the	  more	  authoritarian	  regimes	  that	  are	  not.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  countries	  are	  illiberal	  but	  receiving	  huge	  amounts	  of	  funding	  and	  support	  from	  these	  Western	  democratic	  countries,	  then	  it	  would	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  the	  motivation	  for	  democratization	  of	  these	  authoritarian	  countries	  would	  be	  to	  receive	  larger	  amounts	  of	  aid.	  	  Such	  motivations	  might	  come	  not	  only	  from	  the	  aid,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  other	  support	  and	  incentives	  that	  are	  present	  in	  joining	  the	  ‘democracy	  club’	  such	  as	  trade	  incentives	  and	  political	  partnerships,	  though	  this	  would	  require	  future	  research	  to	  look	  into	  it	  that	  is	  not	  addressed	  within	  my	  paper.	  I	  will	  be	  using	  Polity	  IV	  to	  measure	  regime	  type	  (how	  authoritarian	  or	  democratic	  the	  country	  is).	  	  This	  will	  be	  compared	  with	  ODA	  disbursements	  to	  determine	  the	  amount	  of	  aid	  allocated	  as	  well	  as	  the	  changes	  in	  aid.	  	  I	  will	  expand	  upon	  this	  further	  in	  the	  methodology	  section.	  	  	  
IV:	  Methodology	  	   The	  question	  being	  addressed	  is	  “if	  aid	  is	  able	  to	  influence	  countries	  to	  democratize?”	  	  When	  looking	  at	  this	  question	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	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democratization.	  	  As	  stated,	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  if	  aid	  influences	  this	  transition	  and	  if	  the	  aid	  promise	  of	  more	  economic	  inducement	  is	  enough	  to	  encourage	  a	  country	  to	  make	  the	  transition.	  	  My	  independent	  variable,	  aid,	  will	  be	  measured	  by	  ODA	  as	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  the	  aid	  that	  countries	  receive,	  and	  is	  primarily	  provided	  by	  Western	  democratic	  countries.	  	  This	  should	  then	  reflect	  the	  policies	  and	  ideologies	  of	  these	  countries.	  	   The	  first	  challenge	  that	  I	  faced	  was	  finding	  an	  aid	  program	  that	  promoted	  democracy.	  	  While,	  I	  was	  originally	  going	  to	  look	  at	  World	  Bank	  political	  conditional	  aid	  programs,	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  access	  that	  information5.	  	  However,	  ODA	  also	  provides	  data	  on	  country-­‐by-­‐country	  aid	  allotments	  each	  year	  for	  the	  past	  10	  years	  from	  2000	  to	  2009.	  	  The	  use	  of	  multiple	  years	  permitted	  me	  to	  compare	  the	  changes	  in	  aid	  over	  time,	  and	  to	  see	  if	  the	  changes	  in	  regime	  type	  had	  any	  impact	  on	  aid	  allocation.	  	  Another	  benefit	  of	  using	  ODA	  is	  that	  it	  accounts	  for	  large	  amounts	  of	  aid	  that	  developing	  countries	  receive	  (120	  billion	  dollars	  in	  2009	  alone)	  (OECD,	  DAC	  Statistical	  Tables).	  	  	  Since	  the	  largest	  donors	  are	  western	  democratic	  countries	  the	  aid	  allocation	  would	  thus	  reflect	  western	  democratic	  ideals	  and	  policies	  (OECD,	  DAC	  Statistical	  Tables).	  	  	  I	  gathered	  the	  data	  from	  a	  website	  called	  AidFlows	  since	  they	  had	  the	  year	  by	  year	  statistics	  on	  ODA	  received	  by	  the	  beneficiary	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  the	  donor	  countries	  and	  then	  complied	  that	  data	  into	  an	  Excel®	  spreadsheet.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  I	  looked	  through	  various	  World	  Bank	  programs,	  but	  none	  were	  specific	  enough	  to	  asertain	  if	  they	  were	  based	  in	  conditional	  aid.	  	  They	  were	  also	  specific	  to	  each	  different	  country	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  provide	  a	  pool	  of	  conditional	  aid	  reciving	  countries.	  	  After	  that	  I	  called	  the	  World	  Bank	  on	  several	  occasions,	  as	  well	  as	  e-­‐mailing	  them,	  and	  got	  the	  answer	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  information	  that	  I	  needed,	  or	  simply	  would	  not	  help	  me.	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   The	  next	  challenge	  was	  finding	  an	  index	  to	  judge	  regime	  type.	  	  While	  a	  number	  of	  indices	  were	  considered	  (to	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  paragraph),	  I	  decided	  to	  use	  Polity	  IV	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  The	  first	  of	  which	  is	  that	  this	  particular	  index	  measures	  regime	  type	  specifically	  along	  the	  spectrum	  of	  democratic	  to	  authoritarian.	  	  “The	  Polity	  conceptual	  scheme	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  examines	  concomitant	  qualities	  of	  democratic	  and	  autocratic	  authority	  in	  governing	  institutions,	  rather	  than	  discreet	  and	  mutually	  exclusive	  forms	  of	  governance.	  This	  perspective	  envisions	  a	  spectrum	  of	  governing	  authority	  that	  spans	  from	  fully	  institutionalized	  autocracies	  through	  mixed,	  or	  incoherent,	  authority	  regimes	  (termed	  "anocracies")	  to	  fully	  institutionalized	  democracies.”	  (Polity	  IV).	  	  	  	  	  Another	  reason	  that	  I	  used	  this	  index	  is	  because	  others	  failed	  to	  address	  regime	  type.	  	  	  	   Although	  the	  Freedom	  House	  index	  also	  has	  a	  metric	  for	  “freedom,”	  I	  preferred	  an	  index	  not	  associated	  with	  a	  specific	  agenda	  of	  the	  government	  that	  helps	  to	  fund	  it.	  	  “Freedom	  House	  is	  an	  independent	  watchdog	  organization	  that	  supports	  the	  expansion	  of	  freedom	  around	  the	  world.	  Freedom	  House	  supports	  democratic	  change,	  monitors	  freedom,	  and	  advocates	  for	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights”	  (Freedom	  House).	  	  Another	  index	  considered	  was	  the	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit’s	  Democracy	  Index,	  which	  measures	  democracy	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0-­‐10	  with	  10	  being	  democratic	  and	  0	  being	  the	  most	  restrictive	  authoritarian	  regime	  (Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit).	  	  The	  largest	  problem	  with	  this	  index	  though	  is	  that	  I	  couldn’t	  get	  the	  information	  and	  index	  for	  more	  than	  2010	  and	  2008.	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   Polity	  IV	  has	  a	  scoring	  system	  that	  ranges	  from	  -­‐10	  to	  106,	  along	  with	  this	  shifting	  scale,	  they	  take	  into	  account	  the	  operations	  and	  freedoms	  of	  the	  governments	  to	  act	  both	  on	  the	  side	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  a	  democratic	  one.	  	  
	  
Bias	  within	  Indices	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  some	  of	  the	  bias	  within	  the	  research	  design.	  	  It	  is	  operating	  within	  the	  bias	  of	  Western	  democratic	  countries,	  which	  are	  giving	  the	  aid,	  according	  to	  their	  standards	  and	  conditions.	  	  By	  operating	  within	  these	  biases	  though,	  it	  can	  also	  help	  to	  gauge	  the	  type	  of	  reform	  that	  is	  occurring.	  	  Isolating	  all	  other	  factors,	  we	  can	  see	  what	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  aid	  towards	  encouraging	  democratization	  of	  non	  or	  less	  democratic	  countries	  is,	  as	  well	  as	  possibly	  of	  uncovering	  the	  lending	  trends	  of	  the	  Western	  democratic	  donors.	  	   An	  additional	  bias	  that	  is	  unavoidable	  is	  the	  methods	  of	  judging	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  democratic	  regimes	  is	  highly	  colored	  by	  the	  United	  States	  agenda,	  especially	  since	  they	  are	  so	  heavily	  funded	  by	  the	  US.	  	  In	  fact	  according	  to	  the	  Freedom	  House	  2007	  Financial	  Report,	  the	  US	  government	  provides	  66%	  of	  their	  funding	  worth	  10.5	  million	  dollars	  per	  year,	  which	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  be	  bias	  towards	  the	  US	  political	  agenda.	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  transparency	  within	  the	  process	  of	  judging	  and	  classifying	  the	  information	  as	  well	  (Freedom	  House	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Polity	  IV	  uses	  a	  numerical	  system	  of	  judging	  countries	  from	  being	  most	  authoritarian,	  with	  a	  score	  of	  -­‐10,	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  most	  democratic	  with	  a	  score	  of	  10.	  	  All	  countries	  fall	  somewhere	  between	  the	  -­‐10	  and	  10	  scores	  unless	  they	  are	  facing	  transitions	  which	  receives	  a	  score	  of	  -­‐88,	  are	  in	  a	  state	  of	  anarchy	  which	  is	  a	  score	  of	  -­‐77,	  and	  they	  also	  have	  a	  score	  of	  -­‐66	  which	  is	  in	  the	  case	  of	  countries	  that	  are	  under	  foreign	  control.	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Financial	  Report	  2007).	  	  These	  different	  programs	  lack	  transparency	  in	  how	  they	  get	  their	  information	  and	  then	  classify	  it.	  	  A	  criticism	  from	  authors	  such	  as	  Munck	  and	  Verkuilen	  write:	  	   Obscuring	  the	  entire	  exercise	  [of	  measuring	  freedom	  or	  the	  type	  of	  government],	  very	  little	  is	  done	  to	  open	  the	  process	  of	  measurement	  to	  public	  scrutiny.	  .	  .	  the	  sources	  of	  information	  are	  not	  identified	  with	  enough	  precision	  so	  that	  independent	  scholars	  could	  reanalyze	  them.	  To	  make	  matters	  even	  worse,	  the	  failure	  to	  make	  public	  the	  disaggregated	  data	  ensures	  that	  a	  scholarly,	  public	  debate	  about	  issues	  of	  measurement	  is	  virtually	  impossible.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  aggregate	  data	  offered	  by	  Freedom	  House	  has	  to	  be	  accepted	  largely	  on	  faith	  (Munck,	  21)	  	  By	  not	  revealing	  sources	  of	  how	  the	  indices	  gather	  their	  information,	  it	  allows	  them	  to	  use	  whatever	  means	  they	  wish	  to	  determine	  the	  levels	  democracy	  without	  worrying	  about	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  method	  which	  leaves	  a	  huge	  question	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  models.	  	  As	  a	  result	  they	  could	  be	  using	  bias	  methods,	  a	  small,	  inaccurate	  collection	  of	  informants,	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  twist	  the	  information	  to	  suit	  the	  answers	  that	  Freedom	  House	  or	  any	  other	  index	  wants	  for	  their	  own	  purposes	  and	  without	  transparency	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  prove	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  tests.	  	  Kenneth	  Bollen	  writes	  about	  his	  objections	  to	  democracy	  indicators	  that	  come	  from	  the	  West.	  	  He	  says	  that	  what	  the	  indices	  use	  to	  measure	  democracy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  indices	  use	  incorrect	  or	  biased	  information	  that	  skews	  the	  results	  to	  give	  the	  answers	  and	  level	  of	  freedom	  that	  their	  bias	  prefers.	  	  He	  sums	  up	  his	  finding	  with	  “These	  include	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  country	  being	  rated	  to	  the	  judge’s	  home	  country,	  the	  political	  orientation	  of	  the	  judge,	  or	  any	  personal	  stakes	  in	  the	  rating”	  (Bollen,	  18).	  	  Regardless	  of	  what	  the	  findings	  are,	  they	  will	  be	  skewed	  by	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  home	  country	  where	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the	  indicator	  comes	  out	  of.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Freedom	  House	  and	  Polity	  IV,	  both	  come	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  and	  suggests	  a	  possible	  skew	  towards	  the	  United	  States	  agenda	  and	  policies.	  	  For	  my	  purposes,	  Polity	  IV	  is	  appropriate,	  but	  for	  future	  and	  further	  detail,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  these	  biases	  into	  account	  and	  recognize	  the	  limitations	  that	  come	  from	  them.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  some	  of	  the	  bias	  within	  the	  research	  design.	  	  The	  research	  design	  is	  operating	  within	  the	  bias	  of	  Western	  democratic	  countries	  who	  are	  giving	  the	  aid	  since	  it	  is	  their	  standards	  and	  conditions	  that	  are	  being	  met.	  	  By	  operating	  within	  these	  biases	  though,	  the	  research	  can	  also	  help	  to	  gauge	  the	  type	  of	  reform	  that	  is	  occurring.	  	  Also,	  isolating	  all	  other	  factors,	  the	  research	  can	  see	  if	  aid	  is	  effective	  in	  encouraging	  democratization	  and	  or	  liberalization.	  
	  
Limit	  is	  to	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  	   For	  this	  research,	  I	  am	  using	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  totals.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ODA	  numbers	  and	  changes	  in	  aid	  will	  also	  encompass	  the	  preferences	  and	  policies	  of	  other	  countries	  whose	  democratic	  priorities	  do	  not	  align	  with	  those	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  	  There	  are	  currently	  50	  donor	  countries	  whose	  contributions	  are	  included	  in	  these	  statistics,	  and	  while	  the	  US	  and	  Western	  Democratic	  countries	  account	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  aid	  allocation,	  there	  are	  still	  contributions	  from	  countries	  like	  China,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  Oman	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  Since	  some	  of	  these	  countries	  have	  values	  different	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from	  democracy	  promotion,	  this	  difference	  in	  values	  could	  provide	  a	  skew	  in	  the	  data	  and	  contribute	  to	  a	  no	  correlation	  conclusion.	  	   Another	  possible	  problem	  with	  the	  Official	  Development	  Aid	  as	  operationalization	  for	  my	  independent	  variable	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  specifically	  target	  democratization.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  my	  literature	  review,	  this	  is	  aid	  reported	  by	  donor	  countries	  and	  is	  allocated	  for	  the	  expressed	  purpose	  of	  economic	  development.	  	  While	  this	  economic	  development	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  building	  industry,	  improving	  education	  and	  setting	  up	  infrastructure,	  to	  name	  a	  few,	  it	  cannot	  be	  explicitly	  political	  in	  nature.	  	  Since	  my	  study	  is	  trying	  to	  connect	  political	  motivations	  with	  economic	  ones,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  aid	  in	  itself	  and	  conditions	  towards	  democratization.	  The	  study	  is	  instead	  going	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  trend	  of	  preferential	  aid	  allocation	  towards	  more	  democratic	  countries.	  	  This	  limitation	  could	  be	  one	  that	  nullifies	  my	  study,	  but	  since	  it	  is	  preliminary	  in	  nature	  to	  begin	  with,	  using	  ODA	  should	  be	  sufficient	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  a	  pattern	  present.	  
	  
Research	  Design	  	  	   I	  first	  built	  a	  table	  comparing	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  aid	  allocation	  to	  the	  Polity	  IV	  score	  on	  regime	  type.	  	  The	  index	  in	  itself	  was	  built	  using	  the	  established	  databases	  from	  Polity	  IV	  and	  AidFlows	  and	  simply	  combining	  the	  information	  into	  my	  own	  index	  that	  put	  the	  two	  next	  to	  one	  another.	  	  The	  ODA	  numbers,	  supplied	  by	  AidFlows,	  covered	  total	  aid	  allocated	  and	  claimed	  by	  donor	  countries	  as	  ODA	  around	  the	  world	  with	  the	  United	  States	  donating	  over	  twice	  as	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much	  as	  the	  next	  leading	  country	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  While	  I	  cover	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  US	  democracy	  promotion	  policies,	  my	  data	  encompasses	  the	  donations	  by	  various	  other	  countries	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  	  The	  leading	  contributors	  of	  ODA,	  behind	  the	  United	  States,	  are	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Japan,	  along	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  developed	  Western	  European	  countries	  who	  make	  up	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  donations.	  	  There	  are	  also	  other	  developed	  countries	  contributing,	  like	  China,	  Mexico,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  There	  are	  50	  aid	  donors	  in	  total	  who	  contribute	  to	  the	  ODA	  totals.	  	   The	  data	  on	  the	  ODA	  funding	  covered	  the	  aid	  allotments	  from	  2000	  to	  2009	  for	  154	  beneficiary	  countries.	  	  From	  there	  I	  used	  Polity	  IV	  to	  rank	  the	  regime	  type	  of	  these	  countries	  on	  a	  year-­‐by-­‐year	  basis.	  	  Between	  the	  countries	  receiving	  ODA	  and	  the	  countries	  covered	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  index	  I	  was	  left	  with	  111	  countries.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  my	  research,	  the	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  is	  the	  operationalization	  of	  my	  independent	  variable	  and	  democracy	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  	   After	  that	  I	  began	  to	  graph	  the	  data	  with	  aid	  amounts	  and	  polity	  scores	  on	  a	  yearly	  basis,	  running	  regressions	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  aid	  allocation	  and	  regime	  type.	  	  My	  initial	  results,	  after	  running	  an	  R²	  test7,	  showed	  that	  there	  wasn’t	  any	  correlation	  between	  funding	  and	  democratization/polity	  levels.	  	  I	  also	  tried	  to	  account	  for	  lag.	  	  Rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  test	  was	  used	  to	  see	  if	  the	  line	  of	  best	  fit,	  assigned	  to	  the	  graphed	  information	  through	  the	  regression,	  was	  accurate.	  	  The	  R²	  test	  figures	  out	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  original	  regression	  rating	  the	  regression	  from	  a	  score	  of	  1,	  meaning	  that	  the	  line	  was	  a	  perfect	  match,	  and	  from	  there	  it	  drops	  in	  accuracy	  all	  the	  way	  to	  a	  0	  meaning	  absolutely	  no	  match.	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comparing	  the	  polity	  score	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  I	  compared	  the	  polity	  score	  with	  the	  aid	  amount	  from	  the	  following	  year	  and	  ended	  up	  with	  the	  same	  results	  of	  no	  correlation.	  	   The	  next	  tests	  that	  I	  ran	  were	  to	  throw	  out	  all	  of	  the	  polity	  scores	  of	  -­‐88,	  -­‐77	  and	  -­‐66	  to	  see	  if	  these	  were	  skewing	  the	  data	  since	  these	  were	  instances	  of	  outliers	  and	  exceptions	  to	  the	  Polity	  IV	  scores.	  	  I	  found	  that	  it	  made	  the	  R²	  test	  results	  even	  worse	  than	  before	  with	  scores	  of	  R²	  =	  0.0003	  rather	  than	  the	  R²	  =	  0.1438	  that	  I	  was	  getting	  for	  the	  year	  2008	  (this	  was	  the	  year	  with	  the	  best	  R²	  test	  results).	  	   I	  repeated	  both	  tests	  to	  try	  and	  account	  for	  lag	  in	  the	  funding	  for	  one	  year	  at	  a	  time;	  for	  example,	  I	  would	  compare	  the	  polity	  score	  from	  2000	  to	  the	  aid	  from	  2001.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  I	  found	  similar	  results	  that	  once	  again	  showed	  no	  correlation.	  	   Finally	  I	  took	  all	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  had	  had	  a	  regime	  transition	  during	  the	  10	  years	  of	  data,	  with	  both	  increasing	  and	  decreasing	  polity	  scores,	  and	  compared	  the	  3	  years	  of	  funding	  following	  the	  change	  in	  polity	  score	  to	  the	  general	  trend	  in	  changes	  to	  policy	  scores.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  processing	  this	  data,	  I	  kicked	  out	  countries	  that	  only	  received	  ODA	  for	  1	  or	  2	  years	  before	  becoming	  donors	  themselves	  (this	  wasn’t	  a	  large	  enough	  pool	  of	  data	  and	  they	  were	  all	  very	  democratic	  countries	  that	  became	  more	  developed	  that	  no	  longer	  needed	  the	  aid).	  	  I	  also	  removed	  countries	  whose	  polity	  scores	  changed	  in	  2009	  or	  2008	  since	  there	  wouldn’t	  be	  enough	  data	  to	  figure	  out	  if	  their	  funding	  increased	  or	  decreased	  which	  left	  me	  with	  82	  instances	  of	  government	  change	  over	  the	  9	  years	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that	  I	  used	  (this	  included	  polity	  scores	  from	  1999	  since	  I	  was	  only	  looking	  at	  aid	  from	  the	  following	  years).	  	  	  	   From	  there,	  instead	  of	  comparing	  the	  total	  aid	  allocation	  amounts,	  I	  looked	  at	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  aid	  amounts	  increased	  or	  decreased	  over	  the	  three	  year	  period.	  	  I	  also	  compared	  the	  changes	  with	  the	  overall	  change	  in	  aid	  between	  all	  111	  countries	  that	  I	  initially	  had,	  so	  if	  one	  year	  a	  country’s	  aid	  increased	  by	  less	  then	  the	  overall	  increase	  in	  aid	  I	  would	  consider	  it	  to	  be	  a	  mixed	  result.	  	  That	  way	  I	  could	  rule	  out	  increases	  or	  decreases	  in	  aid	  that	  were	  simple	  reflections	  of	  aid	  allocation	  in	  general.	  	  	  I	  then	  figured	  out	  if	  there	  was	  an	  overall	  increase,	  decrease	  or	  mixed	  results	  in	  aid	  allocation.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  isolating	  instances	  of	  governmental	  transition	  was	  to	  look	  specifically	  at	  cases	  of	  governmental	  liberalization	  to	  see	  if	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  rewarding	  the	  changes	  to	  more	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  I	  also	  included	  negative	  transitions	  to	  see	  if	  the	  reverse	  occurred	  as	  well	  with	  a	  decrease	  in	  funding	  in	  cases	  of	  more	  authoritarian	  transitions.	  	   Finally	  I	  separated	  the	  changes	  into	  two	  charts.	  	  I	  split	  the	  charts	  into	  two	  sides,	  one	  being	  positive	  regime	  transitions	  and	  the	  other	  being	  negative	  regime	  transitions.	  	  Under	  these	  two	  categories	  I	  separated	  the	  transitions	  further,	  starting	  with	  countries	  transitioning	  from	  scores	  of	  -­‐88	  to	  -­‐6,	  -­‐6	  to	  -­‐3,	  -­‐3	  to	  0,	  0	  to	  3,	  3	  to	  6,	  and	  6	  to	  10.	  	  Under	  these	  cases	  I	  compared	  the	  total	  number	  of	  transitions	  that	  occurred,	  and	  then	  the	  cases	  of	  a	  positive	  correlation,	  negative	  correlation	  and	  mixed	  correlation.	  	  	  (look	  to	  chart	  1.1	  and	  1.2)	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   This	  too	  showed	  up	  pretty	  much	  no	  correlation	  within	  the	  overall	  data	  of	  an	  increase	  or	  decrease	  in	  aid	  relative	  to	  the	  transition	  except	  for	  three	  categories,	  that	  of	  the	  -­‐88	  to	  -­‐6,	  -­‐6	  to	  -­‐3,	  and	  -­‐3	  to	  0	  categories	  on	  the	  positive	  transition	  side.	  	  This	  means	  that	  these	  countries	  increased	  their	  polity	  scores	  to	  move	  towards	  the	  more	  democratic	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  	  All	  three	  categories	  showed	  a	  trend	  of	  increased	  aid	  relative	  to	  their	  increase	  in	  polity,	  but	  with	  the	  number	  of	  mixed	  scores	  there	  cannot	  be	  a	  conclusive	  argument	  that	  these	  transitions	  always	  result	  in	  aid	  increases,	  or	  even	  what	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  change	  in	  aid	  is.	  	   I	  also	  repeated	  the	  same	  exercise	  with	  aid	  levels	  for	  the	  three	  years	  before	  the	  transition	  (this	  includes	  the	  year	  that	  the	  transition	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  Polity	  IV)	  as	  seen	  in	  chart	  1.2.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  looking	  at	  the	  three	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  transition	  was	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  before	  the	  transition	  that	  might	  have	  motivated	  or	  pushed	  a	  country	  to	  transition.	  	  This	  showed	  no	  real	  correlation	  between	  aid	  allocation	  and	  changes	  in	  aid	  before	  the	  transition	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  country	  was	  making	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  transition.	  	  	  For	  the	  data	  I	  threw	  out	  all	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  transitions	  before	  2000	  since	  I	  lacked	  any	  financial	  data	  before	  2000,	  and	  extended	  my	  pool	  to	  encompass	  the	  data	  up	  to	  2009.	  	  Once	  again,	  I	  judged	  the	  changes	  in	  aid	  relative	  to	  the	  overall	  trends	  in	  aid	  changes	  for	  each	  year	  and	  categorized	  them	  as	  having	  an	  increase,	  decreased,	  or	  mixed	  result	  in	  aid.	  	  There	  was	  no	  clear	  trend	  of	  aid	  impacting	  regime	  changes.	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V.	  Findings	  	   My	  findings	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  no	  correlation	  between	  regime	  type	  and	  overall	  aid	  allotments.	  	  This	  makes	  sense	  for	  many	  reasons	  including	  	  -­‐ the	  different	  sizes	  of	  the	  countries	  who	  are	  receiving	  aid	  (countries	  like	  Mexico	  can	  take	  on	  a	  lot	  more	  debt	  and	  would	  need	  more	  aid	  than	  small	  island	  nations	  like	  Antigua	  and	  Barbados).	  	  	  -­‐ how	  willing	  a	  country	  is	  to	  take	  loans	  from	  the	  international	  community,	  	  -­‐ other	  interests	  of	  the	  donor	  countries	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  want	  to	  fund.	  	  	  There	  are	  also	  factors	  such	  as	  how	  developed	  the	  economy	  is,	  which	  can	  play	  a	  roll	  in	  this	  since	  the	  more	  economically	  developed	  a	  country	  is	  the	  less	  official	  development	  assistance	  they	  should	  need.	  	   So	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  correlation	  between	  aid	  allotment	  and	  regime	  type,	  which	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  determining	  aid	  allotment	  overall.	  	   The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  study,	  where	  I	  looked	  specifically	  at	  countries	  that	  had	  regime	  transitions,	  showed	  slightly	  different	  results.	  	  The	  first	  chart	  1.1	  shows	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  for	  countries	  that	  are	  transitioning	  from	  very	  authoritarian	  regimes	  with	  scores	  from	  -­‐88	  through	  0	  towards	  more	  democratic	  or	  liberal	  institutions	  while	  countries	  making	  transitions	  from	  0	  onwards.	  	  Both	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  the	  levels	  of	  liberalization	  saw	  no	  clear	  trend	  towards	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  aid.	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   The	  other	  side	  of	  my	  examination	  of	  regime	  transitions,	  which	  looked	  at	  the	  aid	  for	  the	  three	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  transition,	  showed	  no	  real	  trend	  for	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  aid	  that	  would	  be	  meaningful	  as	  seen	  in	  chart	  1.2.	  	   What	  is	  interesting	  about	  the	  results	  of	  chart	  1.1	  is	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  increases	  in	  aid	  would	  be	  expected	  from	  the	  range	  of	  perhaps	  -­‐3	  through	  6,	  where	  there	  are	  very	  illiberal	  democracies,	  or	  countries	  that	  are	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  democratizing	  given	  that	  the	  literature	  says	  that	  aid	  is	  best	  allocated	  to	  countries	  which	  are	  democratic	  and	  providing	  civil	  liberties.	  	  What	  I	  saw	  was	  a	  trend	  of	  increasing	  ODA	  to	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  without	  a	  clear	  preference	  or	  real	  increase	  in	  aid	  to	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  already	  partially	  democratic	  and	  transitioning	  up	  the	  scale	  towards	  more	  liberal	  democracies.	  
	  
VI.	  Conclusion	  and	  Future	  Research	  
Summary	  	   This	  was	  a	  preliminary	  study	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  an	  association	  between	  aid	  allocation	  and	  democratization,	  looking	  to	  see	  whether	  or	  not	  aid	  can	  motivate	  democratization.	  	  The	  literature	  on	  aid	  effectiveness,	  along	  with	  United	  States	  international	  policy	  on	  aid,	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  would	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  in	  cases	  where	  meaningful	  democratization	  would	  occur.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  correlation	  between	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  and	  democratization,	  though	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  when	  transitioning	  more	  towards	  liberalization,	  will	  generally	  be	  rewarded	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  aid.	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Implications	  
	   There	  are	  several	  possible	  implications	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  study.	  	  The	  first	  of	  which	  is	  the	  gap	  between	  United	  States	  political	  discourse	  on	  democratization	  and	  aid	  distribution.	  	  As	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  in	  instances	  where	  countries	  made	  transitions	  to	  liberal	  or	  even	  illiberal	  democracies.	  	  Instead,	  the	  results	  would	  suggest	  that	  only	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  transitions	  towards	  liberalization	  were	  rewarded	  with	  increases	  of	  aid	  and	  not	  the	  countries	  that	  were	  democratizing.	  	  Since	  this	  study	  only	  covers	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  from	  2000	  to	  2009,	  this	  trend	  only	  speaks	  to	  the	  actions	  and	  policies	  of	  the	  Bush	  (43)	  and	  end	  of	  the	  Clinton	  Administrations.	  	  However,	  the	  data	  shows	  that	  perhaps	  instead	  of	  being	  so	  concerned	  with	  democratization	  of	  countries	  around	  the	  world,	  they	  were	  instead	  interested	  in	  other	  policy	  goals.	  	  These	  policy	  goals	  could	  be	  additional	  factors	  that	  are	  not	  a	  component	  of	  this	  study.	  	  However,	  the	  results	  are	  clear	  that	  democracy	  promotion	  was	  one	  of	  the	  least	  concerns	  for	  Official	  Development	  Assistance	  allocation.	  	  (There	  could	  be	  a	  preference	  for	  democratic	  countries	  reflected	  in	  other	  types	  of	  aid.	  	  With	  groups	  like	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Corporation	  and	  other	  governance	  conditional	  aid	  programs	  that	  are	  made	  to	  specifically	  focus	  on	  democratic	  specific	  countries).	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  beneficiary	  countries,	  there	  are	  also	  some	  interesting	  implications.	  	  For	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  benefit	  from	  the	  increase	  in	  aid	  at	  a	  very	  low	  cost	  for	  liberalization.	  	  Even	  small	  moves	  forward	  seem	  to	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  aid,	  and	  for	  transitions	  from	  the	  range	  of	  a	  -­‐10	  to	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a	  -­‐7	  this	  could	  be	  a	  great	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  aid	  allotments	  that	  does	  not	  threaten	  the	  continued	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  But	  for	  each	  additional	  payoff	  there	  would	  be	  a	  decrease	  in	  benefit	  relative	  to	  the	  increased	  possibility	  of	  regime	  change.	  	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Bremmer’s	  J-­‐curve	  where	  the	  marginal	  utility	  of	  reform	  is	  weighted	  on	  one	  side.	  	  Initial	  efforts	  to	  liberalize	  would	  come	  at	  relatively	  little	  cost	  to	  the	  very	  authoritarian	  regime	  making	  positive	  efforts	  towards	  liberalization.	  	  This	  could	  suggest	  a	  possible	  motivation	  for	  the	  authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  liberalize.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  side,	  this	  could	  also	  have	  some	  negative	  implications	  for	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  in	  the	  middle	  section	  of	  the	  J-­‐curve,	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  neither	  highly	  authoritarian	  nor	  are	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  Bremmer’s	  curve	  shows	  that	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  spectrum	  are	  the	  least	  stable	  and	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  political	  and	  social	  upheaval.	  	  These	  are	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  most	  prone	  to	  having	  civil	  wars.	  For	  the	  illiberal	  democracies,	  these	  countries	  could	  possibly	  slide	  back	  towards	  being	  more	  authoritarian	  regimes	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  trends	  in	  aid	  allocation	  to	  increase	  only	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reaching	  the	  0	  Polity	  score	  is	  alarming	  because	  that	  would	  reflect	  the	  possibility	  that	  aid	  rewards	  leaving	  countries	  at	  their	  most	  vulnerable	  stage	  and	  at	  a	  place	  where	  they	  are	  most	  prone	  to	  civil	  wars	  and	  instability.	  	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  from	  this	  study	  that	  shows	  that	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  middle	  who	  do	  not	  receive	  increases	  in	  aid	  after	  liberalizing	  go	  into	  civil	  war,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  aid	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  show	  a	  trend	  of	  increasing	  after	  countries	  transition	  from	  a	  0	  Polity	  score	  are	  potentially	  worrisome.	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Limitations	  and	  Future	  Research	  
	   This	  is	  a	  preliminary	  test	  so	  there	  may	  be	  some	  issues	  with	  its	  assumptions	  and	  conclusions;	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  definite	  need	  for	  future	  research	  with	  additional	  tests	  and	  methods.	  One	  such	  test	  that	  is	  more	  sensitive	  to	  lag	  variables	  as	  well	  as	  expanding	  the	  pool	  of	  data	  to	  be	  tested	  would	  be	  a	  great	  place	  to	  begin.	  Some	  challenges	  are	  timeframe	  issues.	  	  Since	  active	  emphasis	  and	  priority	  on	  democratizing	  is	  newer,	  following	  the	  strong	  stance	  of	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  (43),	  it	  might	  be	  too	  soon	  to	  see	  meaningful	  change.	  	  So	  even	  if	  I	  find	  that	  my	  hypothesis	  is	  correct,	  it	  could	  be	  because	  there	  hasn’t	  been	  enough	  time	  for	  the	  countries	  to	  transition	  towards	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  regime.	  	  These	  countries	  might	  also	  be	  trying	  to	  provide	  more	  for	  their	  people	  and	  liberalizing	  their	  political	  system	  but	  haven’t	  had	  enough	  time	  and	  money	  to	  really	  make	  that	  meaningful	  change	  yet.	  	  	  	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  budgets,	  they	  are	  often	  set	  two	  or	  three	  years	  in	  advance.	  	  	  For	  foreign	  aid	  budgets,	  this	  can	  be	  even	  farther,	  from	  20	  to	  30	  years	  in	  advance,	  so	  a	  question	  is	  how	  much	  of	  that	  budget	  is	  even	  changeable.	  	  Specifically	  with	  the	  Bush	  budget	  (43),	  	  President	  Bush’s	  influence	  wouldn’t	  even	  be	  seen	  until	  2003	  even	  though	  he	  was	  in	  office	  in	  2001.	  	  Even	  then,	  the	  issue	  comes	  that	  even	  after	  a	  president	  proposes	  a	  budget	  congress	  can	  also	  influence	  it	  and	  change	  it	  as	  well.	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Another	  challenge	  is	  isolating	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  the	  democratic	  transition.	  	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  control	  for	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  social	  and	  international	  pressures	  as	  well	  as	  other	  aid	  funds/	  trade	  incentives.	  	  Even	  if	  my	  theory	  is	  true,	  it	  might	  not	  be	  the	  Official	  Development	  Aid	  that	  is	  causing	  this	  change.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  aid	  works	  to	  create	  change	  on	  many	  levels	  including	  educating	  and	  swaying	  the	  populace’s	  inclinations	  and	  belief	  systems	  (there	  has	  been	  a	  big	  push	  around	  the	  world	  to	  spread	  democratic	  ideals	  and	  export	  western	  beliefs	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world).	  	   One	  huge	  limitation	  to	  this	  process	  is	  that	  it	  functions	  under	  the	  Western	  assumptions	  of	  democracy,	  not	  only	  from	  what	  the	  ‘right	  type’	  of	  democracy	  is,	  but	  also	  the	  method	  of	  measuring	  the	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  appropriate	  for	  this	  particular	  study	  since	  it	  is	  a	  means	  of	  measuring	  how	  far	  a	  country	  is	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  for	  aid	  from	  Western	  Countries.	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  type	  of	  democratization	  that	  is	  being	  pushed	  for	  isn’t	  necessarily	  best	  for	  the	  recipient	  country,	  which	  is	  yet	  another	  area	  that	  could	  use	  future	  research.	  	   Something	  else	  that	  is	  important	  to	  note	  is	  that	  aid	  allocation	  in	  itself	  has	  many	  different	  agendas	  and	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Official	  Development	  Assistance,	  the	  spread	  of	  democracy	  is	  not	  the	  most	  important	  goal.	  	  ODA	  might	  be	  able	  to	  show	  a	  broader	  trend,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  going	  to	  reflect	  pure	  interest	  in	  regime	  type	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  receiving	  aid.	  	  Even	  if	  it	  was	  to	  reflect	  political	  agendas	  like	  that	  of	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  (43)	  with	  his	  efforts	  to	  spread	  democracy	  around	  the	  world,	  there	  are	  still	  issues	  to	  account	  for	  like	  lag	  in	  aid	  and	  the	  effects	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of	  preset	  budgets.	  	  It	  would	  also	  be	  beneficial	  to	  include	  longer	  lag	  variables	  in	  future	  research	  as	  well,	  rather	  than	  just	  three	  years.	  	   Limits	  to	  this	  process	  in	  itself	  were	  my	  own	  capabilities.	  	  I	  would	  need	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  statistical	  understanding	  in	  order	  to	  better	  comprehend	  and	  test	  this	  subject,	  but	  there	  were	  also	  limit	  is	  on	  factors	  like	  data.	  	  One	  of	  the	  largest	  limitations	  was	  access	  to	  meaningful	  data.	  	  I	  couldn’t	  get	  a	  hold	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  information	  that	  I	  would	  need	  in	  order	  to	  do	  a	  better	  job	  and	  isolate	  more	  of	  the	  variables.	  	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  I	  originally	  wanted	  to	  look	  at	  democratic	  conditional	  aid,	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  information	  I	  would	  need	  to	  conduct	  such	  a	  study.	  	  I	  would	  also	  need	  a	  larger	  pool	  of	  data	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  10	  years	  and	  84	  transitions	  so	  as	  to	  have	  a	  more	  concrete	  or	  noticeable	  trend.	  	   There	  are	  so	  many	  different	  variables	  and	  factors	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  isolated	  in	  order	  to	  do	  better	  research	  on	  this	  question.	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  would	  need	  to	  be	  controlled	  for	  their	  influences	  and	  effects	  on	  the	  data,	  which	  leaves	  a	  lot	  of	  room	  for	  future	  research	  and	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  much	  room	  to	  work	  on	  in	  this	  area	  of	  study.	  	  Future	  need	  for	  study	  covers	  not	  only	  looking	  at	  other	  conditional	  aid	  programs,	  but	  there	  are	  many	  that	  cover	  all	  maters	  of	  interest	  that	  are	  widely	  spread.	  	  Another	  area	  to	  look	  at	  is	  what	  motivates	  countries	  to	  democratize,	  and	  what	  type	  of	  democracy	  they	  end	  up	  having,	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  theocracy	  like	  Iran	  vs.	  the	  liberal	  democracies	  all	  over	  the	  West.	  	  	  	  	   Future	  research	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  my	  own	  study	  would	  be	  to	  look	  farther	  into	  my	  findings.	  	  That	  should	  include	  a	  qualitative	  study	  on	  the	  countries	  that	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received	  an	  increase	  in	  aid	  after	  their	  transition,	  and	  what	  separated	  them	  from	  the	  rest.	  	  It	  should	  also	  include	  expanding	  the	  pool	  of	  data	  for	  more	  than	  just	  the	  past	  10	  years	  so	  as	  to	  have	  more	  conclusive	  results	  if	  that	  data	  was	  available.	  	   It	  would	  also	  be	  nice	  to	  look	  farther	  into	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  receiving	  the	  aid	  and	  if	  it	  has	  increased	  or	  decreased	  their	  stability.	  	  One	  area	  would	  be	  to	  look	  at	  the	  24	  instances	  where	  aid	  increased	  after	  having	  a	  positive	  transition	  towards	  liberalization	  from	  highly	  authoritarian	  states.	  	  If	  Bremmer’s	  J-­‐curve	  is	  true,	  then	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  these	  countries	  should	  be	  less	  stable	  and	  more	  prone	  to	  violence,	  which	  is	  yet	  another	  area	  to	  look	  at	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	   An	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  most	  authoritarian	  regimes	  got	  increases	  in	  aid	  and	  why	  the	  illiberal	  and	  burgeoning	  democratic	  countries	  did	  not	  get	  the	  same	  type	  of	  increase	  is	  also	  a	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  future	  research.	  	   Another	  possible	  approach	  is	  to	  look	  at	  democratic	  specific	  conditional	  aid	  programs	  and	  see	  if	  there	  is	  any	  type	  of	  correlation	  in	  terms	  of	  encouraging	  countries	  to	  democratize.	  	  This	  would	  be	  a	  better	  approach	  since	  the	  aid	  in	  itself	  is	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  process	  of	  democratization.	  	  Governance	  conditional	  aid	  would	  also	  be	  better-­‐equipped	  draw	  a	  correlation	  between	  aid	  and	  regime	  type.	  	  Unfortunately	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  publically	  available	  information	  this	  might	  not	  be	  possible	  for	  some	  time.	  	   In	  order	  to	  better	  research	  the	  motivations	  behind	  countries	  democratizing,	  it	  would	  be	  important	  to	  look	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  and	  try	  to	  isolate	  the	  largest	  variables	  that	  might	  have	  motivated	  the	  transition	  towards	  a	  more	  democratic	  regime.	  	  Then	  the	  next	  step	  would	  be	  to	  compare	  other	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countries’	  motivating	  factors	  as	  well	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  largest	  motivators	  are	  and	  if	  they	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  aid	  models.	  Yet	  another	  area	  for	  future	  research	  would	  be	  to	  discover	  if	  the	  incentives	  for	  democratizing	  are	  present	  beyond	  aid	  allotments.	  	  Instead	  looking	  at	  whether	  or	  not	  democratic	  preference	  will	  also	  extend	  to	  other	  benefits	  such	  as	  trade	  deals	  and	  stronger	  aid	  funds	  as	  well	  from	  the	  Western	  democratic	  countries.	  	   Overall,	  this	  preliminary	  study	  has	  raised	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  has	  answered.	  	  The	  study	  lends	  in	  itself	  to	  much	  future	  research	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  subjects	  from	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  to	  democratize,	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  aid	  and	  what	  actually	  motivates	  the	  democratic	  countries	  to	  increase	  lending	  in	  the	  pattern	  observed	  in	  my	  research.	  	  When	  I	  get	  back	  to	  the	  initial	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  aid	  motivates	  democracy,	  the	  question	  is	  still	  that	  I	  do	  not	  know,	  but	  hopefully	  this	  paper	  has	  provided	  a	  great	  starting	  point	  to	  find	  out	  if	  it	  does.	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Positive	  Transitions	  (aid	  from	  after	  transition)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Negative	  Transitions	  Transitioning	  from	   -­‐88to	  -­‐6	   -­‐6to	  -­‐3	   -­‐3	  to	  0	   0	  to	  3	   3	  to	  6	   6	  to	  10	   10	  to	  6	   6	  	  to	  3	   3	  to	  0	   0	  to	  -­‐3	   -­‐3	  to	  -­‐6	   -­‐6	  to-­‐9	  Number	  of	  cases	   18	   12	   8	   3	   6	   11	   6	   8	   1	   2	   5	   2	  
Positive	  correlation	  (aid	  increases)	   10	   6	   7	   0	   1	   1	   3	   1	   0	   1	   1	   0	  Negative	  correlation	  (aid	  decreases)	   2	   1	   0	   1	   1	   3	   2	   2	   1	   0	   2	   0	  Mixed	  results	   6	   5	   1	   2	   4	   7	   1	   5	   0	   1	   3	   2	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Positive	  Transitions	  (aid	  from	  before	  transition)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Negative	  Transitions	  Transitioning	  from	   -­‐88to	  -­‐6	   -­‐6to	  -­‐3	   -­‐3	  to	  0	   0	  to	  3	   3	  to	  6	   6	  to	  10	   10	  to	  6	   6	  	  to	  3	   3	  to	  0	   0	  to	  -­‐3	   -­‐3	  to	  -­‐6	   -­‐6	  to-­‐9	  Number	  of	  cases	   11	   10	   6	   1	   9	   7	   8	   13	   0	   3	   3	   5	  
Positive	  correlation	  (aid	  increases)	   6	   5	   2	   1	   1	   2	   3	   1	   0	   0	   1	   0	  Negative	  correlation	  (aid	  decreases)	   2	   2	   1	   0	   2	   2	   1	   4	   0	   0	   0	   3	  Mixed	  results	   3	   3	   3	   0	   6	   3	   5	   8	   0	   3	   2	   2	  
